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The European External Action Service Reviewed: 
How the Arab Uprisings Test the EU’s Newest Foreign Policy Project 
 
Maarten van de Pavoordt 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The Arab uprisings of 2011 and the consequent ousting of long-standing autocratic 
regimes in North Africa have forced the European Union to radically alter its 
relationship with its neighboring region. In effect, this process became the top 
priority for the European External Action Service (EEAS), Europe’s newly created 
foreign policy agency. Now, more than two years later, this thesis asks: To what 
extent has the EEAS, as created by the Treaty of Lisbon, achieved its goal of 
becoming an effective global actor when we review its response to the Arab 
uprisings? Taking Egypt and Libya as case studies, this thesis identifies that the 
EEAS has failed to live up to expectations since it has not succeeded in achieving its 
goals both within the European political arena and abroad. This is the result of both 
institutional weakness and individual shortcomings. Nevertheless, this new 
institution can be seen as yet another step in the incremental development of 
common European capabilities in the field of foreign policy. However, concerning 
the European response to the Arab uprisings the EEAS has not been able to turn the 
EU into the global actor it aspires to be.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 – Observations 
 
The revolutionary and violent events that have continued to sweep across the 
Arab world since December 2010 have had an enormous impact on the global 
political approach towards the region. For decades the governing bodies in the 
MENA region had been characterized by stable authoritarian regimes, but as of 
January 2013 several regimes have collapsed due to fierce protests, most notably in 
Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, while riots and violence continue to rage daily in Bahrain 
and Syria. The European Union, due to its character as a promoter of democratic 
development and its geographic proximity to the area, has been one of the actors 
involved in the building of a new Arab era that aims to be more prosperous, fair and 
peaceful. In doing so, the EU keeps in mind its own interests related to the 
neighboring area, such as security, migration and trade. 
The main EU institution dealing with foreign policy is the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), which was created by the Treaty of Lisbon and formally 
launched on December 1, 2010. The Treaty of Lisbon, also known as the Reform 
Treaty, marked the end of the EU’s three-pillar system and gave the central 
institutions more authority in order to “improve the coherence of the Union’s 
action."1 Subsequently, the coordination of European foreign policy was revisited in 
order to allow the EU to become a more effective global actor and to assert itself as a 
global peace-builder and norm-setter. Now, more than two years after the EEAS’ 
                                                
1 European Union, Treaty of Lisbon, 13-12-2007. Via www.lisbon-treaty.org visited 04-03-2013. 
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conception, this thesis will aim to assess whether this new EU institution has been 
able to fulfill the European wish of a common and independent foreign policy organ 
able to “make a difference” on the world stage. Considering that the Arab uprisings 
erupted almost coincidently with the creation of the EEAS and have since dominated 
its agenda, these revolutionary events function as the ideal setting in which to 
evaluate the new European foreign policy project.  
The focus of this research is the complex structure of the European Union 
and more specifically its authority as a foreign policy institution. Even though the 
foreign policy wing of the EU has remained primarily intergovernmental, member 
states have also become less and less independent in this aspect of governance. 
Resulting from this rise to prominence in international affairs, the EU has challenged 
the traditional state-centric approach in international relations thinking and has 
prompted new theories of state behavior. Among these theories is the concept of 
Multi-level Governance (MLG), which acquired academic standing during the EU’s 
evolution into an international organization with an increasing amount of power. 
This theory explains how EU member states have created an institution with 
independent authority and significant powers without making it a supranational 
entity. In theorizing the governance side of EU’s development it has identified the 
emergence of multiple levels of authority that took upon state functions, which led to 
a subtle decline of state power. Although the concept has been used in several EU 
contexts it has yet to be applied to the EEAS. Subsequently, this thesis will therefore 
focus on the institution’s position within this theoretical framework.  
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1.2 – The Research 
 
This research will thus evaluate the EEAS. This goal stems from a deeper 
desire to grasp and examine the core activities of this new institution that is little 
known by European citizens and one that is even not fully understood by students 
and specialists of international politics. In order to respond to these incentives this 
thesis will focus on the central question: To what extent has the EEAS, as created by 
the Treaty of Lisbon, achieved its goal of becoming an effective global actor when 
we review its response to the Arab uprisings? In order to answer this question, this 
research will also need to address the following questions: How can the EEAS be 
characterized and does its operation comply with the theoretical model of Multi-level 
Governance? What foreign policy tools does the EU possess and are they all equally 
effective? Moreover, this study will look to evaluate several hypotheses, namely that 
(1) the EEAS has been unable to create and execute a clear and unified policy vis-à-
vis the new Arab order, and (2) the EEAS is ill-equipped to realize the goals that 
have been set by various EU documents. 
In order to root this research in the real world, this thesis will focus on the 
European response to the revolutions in Libya and Egypt. Both these countries have 
experienced fundamental changes of government during the Arab uprisings and are 
of great geopolitical importance to the EU. Additionally, since the ousting of their 
leaders in 2011, both countries have settled into a post-dictatorial yet still fluid 
situation and are showing signs of a new era with new priorities and policies. Yet, 
external actors cannot approach both countries the same way by due to three 
important realities. One, whereas Libya had to oust Muammar Gaddafi by means of 
a short but violent civil war, Hosni Mubarak was forced to leave office due to heavy, 
but mainly peaceful, demonstrations. Two, while Egypt’s large and religiously 
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diverse population has chosen the conservative Muslim Brotherhood to lead the post-
revolution state, Libya’s small and majorly tribal population has opted for a more 
moderate future. And three, while Egypt is in dire economic straits and heavily 
relying on foreign creditors, Libya has the comfort of its wealth in resources that can 
help the country to move forward. The EEAS is aware of these differences and has 
therefore been forced to use a wide variety of policies, which results in a wide range 
of material for this research.  
 
1.3 – Challenge and Contribution 
 
In the attempt to formulate a clear and accurate evaluation of the EEAS this 
research will concentrate on comparing the goals that were set by the European 
institutions with the activities of the EEAS. This method demands an analysis of 
primary sources coming out of the EU indicating the aims of EEAS policies. In light 
of this, accords, meeting outcomes, official statements and policies of the relevant 
EU bodies towards post-revolution Arab states will be consulted. In the evaluation 
part of the thesis information coming from both governmental and non-governmental 
European organizations will be included, here one could think of elaborate reports as 
well as newspaper articles. As for the theoretical framework of this research, sources 
from the academic field will be used.  
The main challenge this research faces is formulating the level of success of 
the EEAS. Although the EEAS has set out some explicit general goals, its objectives 
in a specific sense are rather vague. By indicating the strengths and weaknesses of 
the EEAS that have surfaced over the last two years and comparing them to specific 
goals set by single initiatives, this thesis attempts to value the overall efforts of the 
service. Nonetheless, a fully objective analysis will be hard to achieve.  
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Although the aim of this study, to evaluate the EEAS, might sound quite 
modest, it will undoubtedly serve an underlying and more important end of 
providing a better understanding of the increasingly important foreign policy 
mechanism of the European Union. This service has been allocated a bigger budget 
each year and has the potential of becoming a serious actor in global politics. Still, 
regular European citizens are not even aware of its existence and continue to look to 
their national representatives when it comes to international affairs while veteran 
scholars and critics leave the impression that they do not see the EU as a powerful 
foreign policy maker. Although the EEAS is an organization that is still in an early 
phase and which is exploring its infrastructure and capabilities, it cannot be left 
neglected and understudied after two years in operation.  
The more direct contribution of this study will be the evaluation of the EEAS. 
This young institution has been given the green light by the member states at the end 
of 2010 and is looking for a renewal of its mandate in 2014. Considering the fact that 
the EU does not have the reputation of a being a transparent and democratic 
organization, it is of great importance that an outsider sheds a light over the EEAS 
and determines what can be defined as the strengths and weaknesses of the 
organization before the likely approval of a new mandate. In light of this, the Arab 
uprisings have undoubtedly posed the greatest test for the service and are therefore 
the relevant focus of this thesis.  
 Whereas both the contributions above are of a practical nature, this thesis will 
also aim to add a new insight to the theoretical debate. As mentioned before, Multi-
level Governance continues to evolve and has recently developed a categorization 
into two types. This research will thus place the EEAS in this theoretical framework 
and thereby provide further knowledge on how to value this theoretical distinction.  
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1.4 – The Structure of the Thesis  
 
In order to build a strong research foundation this thesis will start out by 
presenting its theoretical framework. As mentioned above this will mainly concern 
the concept of Multi-level Governance as first articulated by Marks and Hooghe 
(1992), but will also include a deeper explanation of the rival theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism as set up by Moravcsik (1993). This theoretical contrast will 
subsequently offer the reader a better understanding of MLG altogether and will 
serve as a justification for the use of MLG in this research on EU foreign policy-
making. This will be followed by an extensive literature review on the academic 
efforts to clarify the mechanisms of EU foreign policy by using the MLG theory.  
 The following chapter will move its focus to the EU, specifically the External 
Action Service. In order to fully understand the significance and capabilities of the 
common foreign policy initiative, a brief genealogy of European cooperation in this 
field will be presented. More detailed information will be given on the recent 
developments that have influenced the current structure of the EU foreign policy-
making process. Subsequently, crucial EU institutions and treaties like CFSP, the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the Foreign Affairs Council and ultimately the EEAS will be 
examined. Also the relationships, interaction and hierarchy between them will be 
further explained. This chapter will serve to establish a clear overview of the current 
goals and capabilities of the EU in the field of foreign policy, thereby providing a 
framework for an overall evaluation after having applied the case studies. 
   After having set up both the theoretical and institutional frameworks, this 
research will turn to an analysis of the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings of recent 
years. First, this chapter will identify the general strategies and objectives towards 
the changed MENA region. Then, the political crises of Libya and Egypt will be 
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particularly studied since the combination of both has forced the EU to employ every 
aspect of foreign policy, including the economic, security and governance aspects. 
Since no specific order of analysis seems necessary, the chapter will adopt a 
chronological order by first delving into the case of Egypt before examining the 
Libyan crisis.  
Before setting up the conclusion, this thesis will devote a chapter to an 
overall analysis that includes a review of the theoretical framework when linked to 
the research findings, the evaluation of formulated hypotheses and the answering of 
the research questions. As a result, this part will eventually be of most significance 
since it will deliver an additional understanding of the MLG theory by applying it in 
another case study and it will include a concise evaluation of the EEAS in 
preparation of the EU’s own assessment that will forego the probable renewal of the 
EEAS mandate in 2014. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
 
The continuously evolving project of extensive cooperation among European 
states has made a big impact on the theoretical debate on state behavior and 
international politics. Especially since the signing of the Single European Act in 
1986 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, when the member states committed 
themselves to unprecedented levels of European cooperation, traditional theories 
have been challenged by alternative ideas that were inspired by this new reality. 
However, the overall debate has remained focused on the traditional dichotomy 
between scholars defending the state-centric assumption and the ones challenging 
that idea. Multi-level Governance (MLG) is one these new concepts challenging the 
state-centric approach and will form the theoretical base of this thesis. It is of great 
importance that this theory must not be mistaken for a theory of integration, since it 
tries to understand the EU as a political system and ignores the puzzle of the 
integration process. For that reason MLG is perfectly suited to function as the 
theoretical framework in this research on the operation of the EEAS.  
 This chapter will present the academic efforts in chronological order, starting 
with the founding article by Gary Marks in 1992. Along the way this overview will 
present the development of MLG from a vague and relatively hollow reaction on the 
new European political order to a full-fledged theory with different strands and a 
significant following. In order to justify the choice for this theory this chapter will 
also include a brief overview of Andrew Moravcsik’s theory of Liberal 
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Intergovernmentalism. Although this theory emerged coincidently with MLG and 
bases its findings on the same historical events, it is often seen as the antithesis of 
Multi-level Governance and has consequently pushed the theory in a certain 
direction. The final part of this chapter will turn to the current state of the theoretical 
debate within MLG and will pay attention to studies applying the theory to EU 
institutions. Here, great attention will be paid to the recent theoretical effort to 
distinguish two types of governing structures that fall within the framework of MLG.  
 
2.2 – Breeding Ground for MLG 
 
While an already decades long debate on the theoretical reasons behind state 
decisions to integrate into a European organization muddled through, a new 
generation of scholars awoke in the 1990’s. This new generation started to treat the 
EU as a political system like any other state. Instead of asking where the EU was 
heading, these scholars were interested in how the international organ works on a 
daily basis. In doing so, these new scholars started to use concepts borrowed from 
domestic and comparative political theory. Highlighting this shift towards theorizing 
EU governance instead of EU integration was the article “The Study of the European 
Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics” by Simon Hix of 1994 in 
which he called upon scholars to ask questions concerning the everyday operating of 
the EU.    
 Here, governance can be defined in accordance with the definition of 
Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (2004) as “a continuous political process of setting 
up goals for society and intervening in it in order to achieve these goals.” They 
concluded that the EU works accordingly while pointing out that policy networking 
is the Union’s most characteristic feature in this process. Their conclusion was not 
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revolutionary since the concept of policy networks had been used in other studies on 
governance such as Business Administration (Thorelli 1986; Powell 1990) and 
Public Policy (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). Börzel (1997) defined policy networks as 
“a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and 
interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with 
regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests 
acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to achieve common goals.” 
Considering this definition, it is understandable that the concept of policy 
networking has always been linked to the EU (Bressand and Nicolaidis 1990; 
Wallace 1990; Keohane and Hoffmann 1991). However, it wasn’t until 1993 when 
Gary Marks came up with the concept of Multi-level Governance, which 
successfully incorporated policy networks in the study of EU governance. Although 
this concept was only modestly introduced, it would eventually grow out to be one 
the major concepts in the study of European politics. 
 
2.3 – MLG’s Inception 
 
Gary Marks first introduced MLG in his article “Structural Policy and Multi-
level Governance in the EC” of 1992. In the article he analyzed the new political 
order that he had seen emerge during EU intergovernmental negotiations on the 
creation of the Structural Policy, better known as the Cohesion Fund, which aimed to 
increase economic and social cohesion in the Union. He pointed out that in order to 
understand EU institution building one should look beyond the interaction between 
the member state and the European institution. Although the prominent European 
treaties are the result of intense interstate interaction on an intergovernmental level, 
much is left unclear about the implementation of these newly signed documents 
 11 
since they primarily voice a common intention. As a result, institutional formation 
and governance is created in ‘Brussels’ and is decreasingly shaped by member states. 
Marks points out that the setting up of the Cohesion Fund is in line with this 
claim. As a result, he claims that the traditional theoretical debate between the 
functionalists, claiming that integration into a supranational Europe comprises state 
autonomy, and the intergovernmental approach of realists is no longer relevant. 
Although these theories oppose each other, they both share the assumption that the 
EU should be studied based on its position vis-à-vis the member state. Marks argues 
instead that the EU should be studied independently since it is a system of 
continuous negotiation among and within governing bodies of different territorial 
tiers. This is what he labeled Multi-level Governance. He concludes that, as a result 
of increased European cooperation, previously state-centralized functions have been 
pulled to both supranational and subnational governing bodies. 
Although Marks came to this conclusion after studying a single mechanism 
of the large range of European organs, his findings opened up new possibilities to 
study the EU in order to better understand its everyday operation. As a result, other 
scholars increasingly embraced the newly introduced idea as a useful concept of 
analysis and subsequently joined the theoretical expedition (Sbragia 1993; Caporaso 
and Keeler 1993). However, Marks remained the central figure in the development 
of the theory in order for it to be able to compete in the academic debate that 
emerged as a result of the recent European developments. In this debate on state 
sovereignty and European cooperation, Andrew Moravcsik and his state-centric 
theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism proved to be the most prominent adversary 
of MLG. Moreover, it was mainly through this debate that the theory of Multi-level 
Governance gained a lot of its theoretical consolidation. 
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2.4 – Theoretical Coming of Age Brings Debate 
 
In the article “European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric versus 
Multi-level Governance” of 1996, Marks, Hooghe and Blank illustrated why a state-
centric approach had become obsolete when talking about the European Union. By 
the time of writing the authors had been able to observe and analyze the changed 
European political constellation as the reforming treaties had been operating in full 
affect for several years. In this respect, one should think specifically of the effects of 
the introduction of qualified majority voting in the European Council and the 
different compositions of the Council of Ministers and the increased power of the 
European Parliament. Furthermore, the author noted that underneath the institutional 
level a new cooperation network between European subnational actors had emerged. 
The authors claim that as a result “authority and policy-making influence are shared 
across multiple levels of government – subnational, national and supranational 
(Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996).”  
The state-centric, or intergovernmentalist, approach refutes the assumption of 
decreased state autonomy. In contrast, it argues that European cooperation is the 
result of intergovernmental bargains and that no country is forced to integrate more 
than it wishes. Additionally, the supranational actor possesses no independent 
influence and is only there to facilitate its members (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1994; 
Milward 1992). From the scholars supporting this view, Andrew Moravcsik and his 
theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism drew the most attention. This theory does 
not deny the supranational character of the EU per se, but emphasizes that it is 
allowed that position by national governments since it strengthens their domestic 
power position and provides them the tools to achieve goals that are otherwise 
unattainable. Moravcsik argues that states have come to erect these institutions 
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because they reduce the transaction costs of international bargaining and should 
therefore be seen as the result of member state calculations (Moravcsik 1993). 
According to this approach, EU policies reflect nothing more than the lowest 
common denominator among state officials. 
While the Multi-level Governance approach shares the assumption that “the 
state arena remains the most important piece of the European puzzle” (Marks, 
Hooghe and Blank 1996), it also claims that states have lost significant influence on 
EU policy-making, which directly affects their territories, in three ways. First, MLG 
finds it uncontestably true that the European Commission and the European 
Parliament (EP) have independent decision-making capacity at the European level, 
meaning that states do not longer monopolize it. Second, collective decision-making 
in the European arena enforces rules across the EU that each member state must 
comply with, even when a member state might oppose one. And third, the political 
arena of Europe has become interconnected, meaning that subnational actors can 
circumvent their national governments and approach Brussels directly. These three 
assumptions argue that both supranational and subnational actors possess policy-
making power. Nonetheless, also in MLG the state remains a powerful part of the 
EU. 
The authors have come to these conclusions after having observed that states, 
individually and even collectively, are limited in executing control over the EU in all 
phases of policy-making. Marks, Hooghe and Blank argue that policy initiative and 
agenda setting competence is mainly held by the EC and to a lesser extent by the EP. 
The member states, as represented by the European Council or the Council of 
Ministers, only define general outlines and meet too rarely to make an impact in this 
phase. Additionally, the influence of subnational actors and interest groups in this 
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stage can be considered significant due to the open-door policy of the Commission. 
This assumption is supported by studies on the EU international energy policy 
(Matlary 1993) and the EU Committee of the Regions (Hooghe 1996). 
According to MLG, also in EU decision-making state dominance has eroded. 
Before the Maastricht Treaty the intergovernmental EC was the sole holder of 
legislative power in the EU. However, after 1992 states lost significant sovereignty 
in this aspect since the EP acquired decision-making power in the form of the co-
decision procedure that gave the Parliament absolute veto power on some issues. 
Furthermore, decision-making in the Council has also become more supranational 
since the introduction of qualified majority voting, meaning that individual states can 
be outvoted. Adding to this, several scholars have also claimed that the Commission 
has claimed indirect decision-making powers because of its expertise and easy 
access to information in specific areas (Hooghe 1996) As a result, MLG argues that 
currently EU decision-making is shared among supranational and national actors on 
the basis of variable lines of authority.      
Lastly, Marks, Hooghe and Blank also have found grounds defending their 
Multi-level Governance theory in the policy implementation phase of EU 
governance. Although in principle states have the responsibility to implement the 
regulations, in practice the Commission appoints committees to monitor this final 
stage (Anderson 1996). In this process subnational actors are often consulted and are 
in direct contact with the European institution. In some policy areas, such as 
environmental policy, this shared implementation capability and interaction with 
local authorities is vital to effective governance. So also in this stage all levels of 
governance are incorporated in the process.  
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In short, the authors are convinced that state executives have lost their 
dominant position in almost all aspects of EU governance and that the new reality of 
policy-making is “characterized by mutual dependence, complementary functions 
and overlapping competencies. (…) Actors from different levels of governance 
operate in a polity of diffuse political control while traditional channels of 
communication are being sidestepped (Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996).” However, 
the authors note that their theorized observation must be seen as transitory since 
Multi-level Governance is unstable due to a lack of a European constitutional 
framework. As a result of the continuous remodeling of EU institutions, 
competencies of all actors must be seen as undetermined.       
Nevertheless, liberal intergovernmentalists have persisted in their belief of 
the uncontested strength of the nation-state in the European Union (Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff 1997; Moravcsik 1997, 1998). For them European integration does not 
challenge the autonomy of the nation-state since they assume that EU members have 
only allowed the supranational institutions capabilities in aspects of governance that 
can only be managed through cooperation. Moravcsik states: “the integration process 
has never superseded or circumvented the political will of national leaders 
(Moravcsik 1998).” According to him, EU institutions do not operate independently 
leading him to focus on decisions and preferences on the national level. This 
conviction sets liberal intergovernmentalists clearly apart from Multi-level 
Governance. 
  However, as European integration has progressed Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism has come under increasing scrutiny (Bukowski, Piattoni and 
Smyrl 2003; Ruzza 2004; Franchino 2012). Specifically the claim that the European 
institutions do not operate independently is often challenged by studies on the EU 
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(Thomson and Hosli 2006; Finke 2009). The most extensive research in this series is 
the study of Jonathan Slapin of 2008 in which he studied member state preferences 
during intergovernmental conferences that led to the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997. 
His analysis demonstrates that during the negotiation process of a new treaty the 
European institutions possess fundamental capabilities to influence the outcome 
since the majority of states, including relatively big powers such as France, were 
unable to realize their goals. Moreover, the intergovernmentalist claim that treaties 
and EU regulations reflect the lowest common denominator among the members was 
also contradicted by a recent similar study (Franchino 2012).  
 
2.5 – More Profile, more Criticism 
 
Multi-level Governance, on the other hand, has gained increasingly more 
input for further theorization by the developments in the EU. This has led to a surge 
of academic work studying the theory to the extent that scholars warned for a 
conceptual overstretch (Piattoni 2009). Aside from this superficial critique, the 
increased attention also generated more substantial criticism. In his article “The 
European Union: an evolving system of Multi-level governance... or government?” 
of 2001, Andrew Jordan identified seven points of criticism on Multi-level 
Governance when applied to the European Union. He contends that MLG: 
1. Is a mixture of already existing theories of policy networking. 
2. Cannot be considered a theory since it only describes the operation of the 
EU. 
3. Overstates the power of subnational authorities in the policy 
implementation phase. 
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4. Assumes that Brussels allocates power to subnational actors, meaning that 
acquiring influence from the bottom-up is impossible. 
5. Excludes significant groups, due to the virtual absence of bottom-up 
influence. 
6. Equates mobilization capacity with actual influence while this is not 
necessarily true. 
7. Ignores the global level of international interaction. 
In response, Stephen George (2004) defended MLG in light of this criticism. 
He acknowledges that MLG is not a revolutionary new concept, but argues that it is a 
“sophisticated restatement” that enables scholars to better grasp European 
developments. However, George completely opposes the claim that MLG cannot be 
considered a theory since scholars who use the concept as a framework in their 
studies disagree over its validity. Considering the other points of critique, George 
points out that they fail to attack the core statement of MLG, which is that the 
European institutions erode state sovereignty. However, he concedes that the 
mobilization capacity of sub-national actors should indeed not be equated with 
influence. Yet, further research on the role of these sub-national actors is welcomed 
and could still justify the claim of MLG. 
Another, more profound, critique came from Peters and Pierre (2004). They 
argue that MLG lacks critical analysis of the consequences of this newly perceived 
EU reality on the democratic process. According to them, the development of Multi-
level Governance into an accepted model could have dangerous implications since it 
advocates a system of informal and formal negotiations between different institutions 
without a clear legal framework. They warn that within this system “core values of 
democratic governance are traded for accommodation and efficiency (Peters and 
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Pierre 2004).” In similar fashion, Jan Olsson (2003) argues that structures of MLG in 
the EU should be abolished because of their democratic deficit. According to Olsson, 
directly elected institutions, either national or supranational, should replace them.   
  As previously mentioned, the profile of MLG increased at the start of the 
new millennium. The idea of a new era in which the developments in technology and 
means of transportation would have an enormous effect on day-to-day life 
encouraged scholars to look ahead and to abandon traditional theories. It became 
clear that in politics, as well as in all other aspects of life, the traditional separation 
between the domestic and international was fading rapidly. This global trend of 
globalization came hand in hand with fragmentation, which led to new demands 
challenging traditional forms of government. MLG could therefore be used globally 
since the concept is capable of facing these new demands due to its character of a 
structure with dispersed, yet linked, “spheres of authority” (Rosenau 2004). MLG 
could also be used to construct an understanding of the current world structure in 
which hierarchy has been weakened by globalization (Jessop 2004). Others however 
remain focused on Europe and concluded that the EU resembles neither a state nor 
an international organization, thereby making all traditional theories ill-suited as 
tools of analysis (Scharpf 2001).   
 
2.6 – Classification in Theory 
 
Both the criticism of MLG and additional scholarly work beyond that of its 
founder Gary Marks indicate that the concept has matured and that is has acquired a 
significant place in the theoretical debate on the EU. Even beyond the scope of 
Europe, MLG has made an impact as a framework of modern day governance. In 
order to keep the theory moving and for it to be useful for analytical studies, Marks 
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and Hooghe returned to the theory building process and further developed the 
concept of MLG. In their article “Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of 
Multi-level Governance” of 2003, Marks and Hooghe introduced two different types 
of MLG. According to the authors, scholars are increasingly supportive of the idea 
that modern society demands a dispersal of authority across multiple actors (Marks 
and Hooghe 2001). However, there is no consensus about how such a society should 
be organized. In order to advance this discussion, Marks and Hooghe present two 
types of MLG and indicate their different strengths and weaknesses. 
 In trying to distinguish between the different structures of MLG, Marks and 
Hooghe focus on the question: Who should be included in a jurisdiction, and what 
should that jurisdiction do (Marks and Hooghe 2003)? After having analyzed global, 
regional, national and local policies, the authors divide the types based on whether 
these levels work together in an authority that is of general purpose or issue-specific. 
Type 1 MLG can be seen as close to the federalist model in which power is 
shared among a limited number of governments from just a few territorial levels. 
Decision-making powers are bundled in packages, making the governing body 
responsible for multiple policies. Furthermore, in Type 1 MLG membership of 
jurisdictions at higher and lower tiers do not intersect due to clearly defined 
boundaries. This type of MLG is crafted in a way that radical adjustment to it is rare, 
although small changes often occur to make the system more durable.  
Type 2 MLG is clearly different since multiple jurisdictions fulfill distinct 
functions. These goal-oriented authorities work independently and smaller 
jurisdictions are allowed to execute their power in every element of the system. Here 
membership thus intersects and hierarchy is less dominant. These kind of problem-
driven systems have appeared in the form of interregional commissions and task 
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forces and are the result of what Rosenau calls “fragmegration (..) a combination of 
fragmentation and integration (Rosenau 1997).” These jurisdictions are formed as a 
quick response to changes in preferences and are therefore less likely to survive than 
Type 1 MLG. The territorial scale of this type can vary from global to regional.  
As mentioned above, the task-specific Type 2 MLG has a higher mortality 
rate than Type 1. Yet, they are more common in international politics. This is 
because governments find them instrumental in reaching their goals while they do 
not directly challenge a wide range of state authority. A global example of a Type 2 
MLG could therefore be the Kyoto environmental agreement. On a more regional 
level, the cross-border cooperation between Mexico and the US on drug trafficking 
could serve as an illustration. Here, also the smallest of authorities is active in the 
system of governance (Blatter 2001).  What is important to note is that a Type 1 
system does not exclude the operating of a Type 2 MLG in the same area, since the 
geographic scope and the subject of analysis can vary.    
From this distinction, the authors note that the two types have a bias towards 
different conceptions of their community. Type 1 MLG is often based on a clear 
territorial community, but can also be based on ethnicity or religion. This community 
thus has a historically crafted identity. As a result, a unit leaving the jurisdiction is 
almost impossible since that would mean a fundamental change of identity in that 
unit. Consequently, the authority is characterized by a stable group of members who 
articulated their conflicts. Type 2 MLG, on the other hand, is much more pliable. 
Here the community shares just the common need for collective decision-making 
authority. When the task has been fulfilled or the need for the organization has 
disappeared members often leave the agreement.    
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 Most governments up to the national level reflect the characteristics of Type 
1 MLG. Especially since World War II decentralization has occurred almost 
anywhere in the world, although most notably in Europe, Here, not only subnational 
institutions were empowered, but also supranational organs were created. Marks and 
Hooghe (2004) indicate that the EU, in line with Type 1, consists of only a few tiers 
of authority while policy competencies are bundled together. However, zooming in 
on aspects of the EU one could claim that the organization has elements that are 
more representative of Type 2 MLG. In addition, the fact that the EU does not 
represent all aspects of a federation, the preferred system of Type 1 MLG, fosters the 
debate on the Union’s character. When looking at the foreign policy wing of EU 
governance it will move even further from Type 1 MLG, although describing it as a 
Type 2 MLG might seem equally unfitting at first sight.      
 
2.7 – A Theory for EU Foreign Policy 
  
Compared to other aspects of governance in the EU, European cooperation in 
foreign policy has taken a different path. Whereas monetary policy for the Euro-
countries has been completely supranationalized, foreign policy cooperation has 
remained more intergovernmental. It is clear that states perceive this element of 
governance to be closely related to their sovereignty. However, according to Michael 
Smith this reality does not exclude this branch of the EU from being outside the 
theoretical reach of MLG. He indicates that the intensification of European 
cooperation in foreign policy since the Treaty of Maastricht has involved several 
intergovernmental, transgovernmental and supranational institutions (Smith 1998). 
In the article “Towards a theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making” of 2004, Smith 
 22 
emphasizes that national and European foreign policy are deeply linked since 
member states do not form their positions in isolation anymore. 
He arrives at this conclusion after having analyzed the operation of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its impact on policies of its 
member states. Although the institution is primarily intergovernmental, there are 
characteristics indicating otherwise. First, CFSP is a coherent policy sector whose 
decisions are legally binding on its members. Second, besides the individual member 
states CFSP, the policy making process also includes the independent European 
Commission who is able to set the agenda and thus steer the direction CFSP is going. 
Additionally, European foreign policy has pushed national foreign policy makers 
towards Europe due to the regular meetings between them. The author also 
emphasizes that the role of subnational actors in foreign policy making has increased 
due to the open character of the Commission. As a result, Smith claims that states 
have lost a significant amount of sovereignty regarding foreign policy and that 
European Multi-level Governance best describes policymaking in this field.   
However, the author concedes that the abovementioned describes an ideal-
type and that a multitude of factors can lead member states to resort to their right to 
take unilateral foreign policy decisions. Smith identifies several situations in which 
MLG is most problematic in EU foreign policymaking: 
• The crisis demanding a response is very violent. 
• The crisis demanding a response calls for direct action. 
• In cases where consensus is the formal rule of decision-making 
• In cases where the European Council has no mandate. 
• In cases where the EU is dependent on states for the implementation 
of the policy. 
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• In cases where the EU needs extra funding from the member states. 
These conditions illustrate that MLG in CFSP is difficult to pursue and leads the 
author to conclude that MLG, in the ideal type, has only been executed once; during 
the European approach towards South Africa in transition in the early 1990’s. 
 
2.8 – The Impact of MLG 
 
From this theoretical overview of Multi-level Governance one can conclude 
that the concept is complex and malleable at the same time. As a result MLG can be 
interpreted in different ways, thereby making it applicable to a wide range of 
international organizations. Gary Marks introduced the concept as a response to the 
process of European integration that fundamentally altered the concentration and 
location of power. In the process Marks shifted the attention from the traditional 
debate on integration to the daily operating of the EU. This new approach to the EU 
inspired scholars to look at the “nature of the beast” and subsequently led to a better 
insight in what was happening in Brussels.  
 As the European Union progressed in its process of integration, MLG was 
repeatedly used as a theoretical tool to understand the development of this 
revolutionary organization. John McCormick inventively linked the emergence of 
both a new organization and a theory by calling MLG “the conceptual cousin of the 
traditional structures of federalism and confederalism (McKormick 2008).” Among 
others, these developments have further challenged the state-centric approach of 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism and favored MLG. However, there are still some 
tough critiques to MLG, namely concerning the effect it has on the democratic level 
of the EU. 
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In the remainder of this thesis MLG will serve as a theoretical background 
for the analysis of the recently introduced European External Action Force. 
Considering the topic of the thesis most attention will be paid to the interaction 
between the European and the national level while the subnational level will be less 
involved. However, this thesis not only aims to utilize MLG in order to better 
understand the EEAS, this thesis also has the ambition to contribute to the theoretical 
debate on MLG. For example, during this research it will be interesting to see how to 
categorize the EEAS along the lines of the typology made by Marks and Hooghe. 
Furthermore, after the study of Smith on the situations impeding MLG in CFSP, this 
thesis may give insight to whether these barriers have been taken down over the 
course of nearly a decade. Hopefully these findings will not contribute to what some 
scholars see as an already overstretched concept and instead add to our 
understanding of MLG.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
EU FOREIGN POLICY STRUCTURE 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
 
The creation of the EEAS is the latest development in a series of EU 
initiatives concerning the enhancement of a European foreign policy. Although 
foreign policy has always been on the agenda of the intergovernmental European 
summits, it has only risen to prominence with the creation of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993. Ever since, its institution building has been a 
top-priority during the subsequent meetings of the European heads of state. 
Alongside the CFSP other initiatives concerning European cooperation in the field of 
foreign affairs have emerged. These developments might give the impression that 
now, after two decades of intensive European debate, this aspect of governance has 
become increasingly Europeanized. This is not necessarily true. Due to the delicate 
position foreign policy authority holds in a state’s perception of its sovereignty, EU 
members have been reluctant to transfer decision-making capabilities to a 
supranational institution. Nevertheless, it would be unjust to characterize the current 
foreign policy structure as solely intergovernmental.  
The signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007, which called for the 
formation of the European External Action service, is the latest expression of a 
common will to advance European cooperation in the field of foreign policy. 
Although the treaty includes a wide range of modifications in EU governance, it has 
been widely interpreted as a document aimed at strengthening the international 
position of the EU (Van Langenhoven and Costea 2007; Howorth 2010). The 
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European Council underscored this focus by stating their belief that the treaty “will 
bring increased consistency to our external action”.2 This new objective could be 
interpreted as the start of a new era in European integration since the common 
market had been completed at the beginning of the millennium and the Union had 
finalized its enlargement towards Eastern Europe.  
Since the official launch of the EEAS in December 2010, the service has 
been expected to manage and improve the pre-existing European structures on 
foreign policy, inter alia the CFSP, and to enhance Europe’s influence in a rapidly 
evolving globalized world. These objectives and the appointment of an independent 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have 
raised the profile of this formerly subordinated aspect of the EU. However, due to its 
unclear mission and complex structure the EEAS has been difficult to comprehend 
for the vast majority of European citizens and has even puzzled students of 
international politics.  
 This chapter thus turns its attention the institutional framework of this 
research and subsequently aims to explain the operating of the EEAS. In order to 
better understand the origins of the EEAS, this chapter will first present a genealogy 
of European cooperation in the field of foreign policy. This is essential since most 
former agreements have never been abolished and are still functioning albeit within a 
new framework. Subsequently, the transformation of the foreign policy wing that 
was inflicted by the Treaty of Lisbon will be closely examined. Here the focus will 
be on the prescribed modus operandi and the legal framework of both the High 
Representative and the EEAS. In the final part of this chapter attention will be paid 
to the goals that have been set out by the several actors involved. This part will be of 
                                                
2 European Council, Presidency Conclusions – Annex on ‘EU Declaration on Globalisation’, 14-12-
2007. Via www.consilium.europa.eu visited 16-05-2013. 
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great interest since it will be crucial in deciding whether the EEAS can be considered 
a successful organ. 
 
3.2 – From Enemies to Allies 
 
The devastating effects of two world wars formed the incentive for six 
European countries to start an international organization. France, Germany, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg were determined to create a structure that 
would prevent a possible outbreak of another massive war on European territory and 
decided to create the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. According to the 
former French foreign affairs minister Robert Schuman this pooling together of the 
several war industries would make war “not merely unthinkable but materially 
impossible.”3 The formation of this first supranational regime ever eventually proved 
to be the start of a peaceful European era in which international cooperation on a 
wide range of issues became a central aspect of governance. Although historically 
European economic integration and both institutional and territorial enlargement has 
claimed most of the world’s attention, cooperation in the field of foreign policy has 
continuously been on the agenda. 
   Very much in line with the idea of coupling the European war industries 
with each other in order to avoid armed conflict in Europe was the French initiative 
of the European Defense Community. This plan surfaced in 1950 and was the first in 
a series of European efforts of foreign policy cooperation. After ratification in four 
countries this proposed supranational military organization was close to being 
implemented were it not for the French Assembly who disapproved it in 1954. As a 
consequence, foreign policy did not feature in the 1958 Treaties of Rome that 
                                                
3 The Schuman Declaration, 09-05-1950. Via www.europa.eu visited 19-05-2013. 
 28 
established the European Economic Community (EEC). The French, led by the 
ambiguous Charles de Gaulle, however continued to push forward a common 
European foreign and defense policy aimed at counterbalancing the American led 
NATO on which Europe relied for regional security. However, the other EEC 
countries did not share this desire thus creating a rift within the community.  
The failure of both these initiatives indicates that an explicit common foreign 
policy institute provoked opposition and created dissent among the member states. 
Yet, the EEC proved to be successful in speaking with one voice to third parties 
during several international trade conventions in the 1960’s. Consequently, this more 
subtle and uncontroversial approach was pursued for the subsequent years and 
resulted in the gradual development of the EEC as a foreign policy actor. Since it did 
not possess any formal competences in foreign policy and member states where not 
fully supportive of the development, friction rapidly emerged. One could state that 
the origin of the traditional European problematic on foreign policy, in which the 
international institute is ahead of its given mandate, lies here (Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan 2008). 
  In response to the grown international profile of the EEC, the member states 
chose to advance foreign policy cooperation by the The Hague Summit Declaration 
of 1969. The Luxembourg Report, issued with the task “to study the best way of 
achieving progress in the matter of political unification, in the context of 
enlargement”4, emphasized that more political cooperation was needed by stating 
that the EEC should focus on the “coordination of foreign policies in order to show 
                                                
4 The Hague Summit Declaration, 02-12-1969. Via www.cvce.eu visited 20-05-2013.   
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the whole world that Europe has a political mission.”5 As a result the European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) was created in 1970.  
The EPC aimed at ensuring a better mutual understanding concerning great 
international problems and encouraged harmonization of views and implementation 
of common action. It operated on an intergovernmental basis in which the European 
Political Committee, consisting of national delegates, would meet regularly. In 
addition, biannual summits among the Ministers of Foreign Affairs would be held. 
Due to positive experiences the EPC adopted the advice of Copenhagen report in 
1973, which specified that “each state undertakes as a general rule not to take up 
final positions without prior consultation with its partners.”6 Yet, no competences 
were transferred to a high authority and the EPC remained strictly separated from the 
rapidly developing EEC framework. In short, the EPC must be seen as an arena in 
which continental norms emerged through consultation rather than an institute 
creating common foreign policies (Øhrgaard 1997). 
The EPC maintained its independence from the other European institutions 
until the first major reform treaty, The Single European Act of 1986. Although no 
fundamental changes were made, the act codified the roles of the European Council, 
Commission and Parliament within the still intergovernmental EPC. However, just 
six years later the foreign policy structure did experience a critical transformation as 
a result of the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty, now already including twelve 
signatories, meant a revolutionary step towards continental integration. While the 
EEC became part of the larger structure of the European Union, the EPC dissolved 
and was replaced by the newly created Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
                                                
5 The Luxembourg Report, 27-10-1970. Via www.cvce.eu visited on 20-05-2013 
6 Second Report on European Political Cooperation in Foreign Policy Matters, 23-07-1973. Via 
www.cvce.eu visited 21-05-2013. 
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The demand for this new structure was the result of significant developments 
in Eastern Europe where the collapse of communist regimes left behind a volatile 
region. The Maastricht Treaty stated that CFSP would safeguard the common values 
and fundamental interests of the Union while aiming to strengthen international 
security and promote democracy, the rule of law and human rights abroad. These 
objectives signified the emergence of the EU as a normative power and were to be 
achieved through systemic European cooperation and joint action. Moreover, the 
treaty demanded states to operate in a spirit of loyalty and ordered its members to not 
take action contrary to the interest of the Union.7 
Understandably, the creation of the CFSP created great expectations. 
However, these hopes faded rapidly when it became clear that the weighty phrases 
around the CFSP were not backed by substantial powers. EU capabilities in this 
aspect were mainly enshrined in Title V of the Maastricht Treaty and stipulated that 
CFSP was to remain a completely intergovernmental body in which the national 
governments maintained full authority. The rational behind placing CFSP in a pillar 
separate from the more supranational European Community pillar was to avoid 
spillovers from the latter into the former. In addition to this institutional standstill, 
the member states also refused to endow the new organ with policy instruments or 
substantial financial resources. Furthermore, also in the field of military and security 
issues, in which differences between member states were starkest, the EU remained 
rather powerless. Although the treaty text included a possible future opening for 
European cooperation on these aspects, it explicitly specified that NATO remained 
the continent’s mayor defense structure.8 
                                                
7 European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 09-05-2008. Via eur-
lex.europa.eu visited 22-05-2013.  
8 Idem.  
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Although not in the framework of CFSP, the EU succeeded in formulating 
strategies and structural policies towards its surrounding regions in the following 
years through other channels. An initiative of particular interest is the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership that was set-up during a conference in 1995 in which EU 
countries and institutions met with governing officials of the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries. This partnership aimed at strengthening ties between the 
EU and its neighboring countries through the pursuit of shared economic, cultural 
and political goals. The partnership came under the control of the Commission who 
allocated the different tasks to various Commissioners. This initiative eventually 
became integrated with the more structural European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
that was developed in 2004. In this structure the EU’s 16 closest neighbors became 
individual partner countries on the basis bilateral political relations with the EU.      
Besides these institutional activities based on trade and values, the deficient 
common foreign policy ambition was eventually also reinvigorated in the late 
1990’s. This was due to the protracted conflict in the Balkans and the EU’s inability 
to cope with it (Bindi 2010). The frustration on both the European and American 
side resulted in the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 
1999. This former taboo subject of cooperation in the field of security went through 
a surprisingly rapid development since only three years after its formation it not only 
established a permanent European military structure but it also already launched its 
first crisis operation in Macedonia. In effect, the ESDP allowed the neglected CFSP 
to become a more active foreign policy actor that was able to put boots on the ground 
in the form of military and civilian missions. 
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3.3 – The Problem of two Pillars 
 
From the overview stated above one could conclude that the former bitter and 
often violent rivalry on the European continent has been transformed into an 
impressive network of transnational, supranational and intergovernmental 
cooperation. This is the result of a multitude of treaties, conventions, declarations 
and accords on effectively every aspect of governance. While competences in several 
fields of authority were completely transferred to a supranational organ, most 
notably in trade and monetary policy, the field of foreign policy has been 
significantly less supranationalized. However, the increase in external actions of the 
EU during the late 1990’s and the 2000’s and the subsequent rise of its international 
profile created internal and external dissatisfaction with the ill-equipped European 
institutions. The culmination of foreign policy arrangements had produced a 
complex structure that demanded a revolutionary reorganization.  
 By the early 2000’s the EU foreign policy system could best be described as 
an organ with “a cumbersome internal structure and a diffuse external 
representation.”9 The pillar structure, as introduced by the treaty of Maastricht, is 
often seen as the cause of the woolly structure since it created two policy-making 
regimes with overlapping competences in defining external action. The first pillar 
included the foreign policy accounts that fall under central European authority, such 
as trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. The supranational 
Commission led policy-making in this pillar, as it possessed the right of initiative 
and carried the responsibility for implementation. Moreover, it represented the EU 
externally in these dossiers. However, the Commission did need a majority in the 
                                                
9 J. Paul, EU Foreign Policy after Lisbon. Will the new High Representative and the External Action 
Service make a difference? CAP Policy Analysis No.2, p. 8.  
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Council of Ministers in most cases, thereby eroding a bit of the supranational 
character of this decision-making regime.    
The second pillar consisted of the decisions concerning CFSP and was 
characterized by the intergovernmental method. Here, the Council of Ministers held 
all authority as no competences were transferred to the EU. During the monthly 
meetings between the several national foreign ministers resolutions could only be 
adopted by unanimity. Nonetheless, in practice the Council would still be reliant on 
the central European institutions. Due to a bigger staff and a wide range of expertise 
the Commission was often asked to help the Council in both policy-making and 
implementation. Additionally, the workload of the Council was often to big causing 
decisions to be made on a lower level within the bureaucratic machinery of Brussels. 
This led scholars to belief that the Council was loosing its grip on the strictly 
intergovernmental CFSP. Terms like ‘commonization’, ‘Brusselization’ and even 
integration were used to describe this development away from a member state 
controlled decision-making regime (Dassu and Missiroli 2002, Barbé 2004, 
Keukeleire and MacNaughton 2008).  
 Although the creation of separate pillars aimed at providing a clear structure 
so that actors, authorities and decision-making procedures were clearly defined, it 
effectively created the opposite. On many topics of foreign policy both pillars were 
used and all EU actors were involved. Critics argued that this structure created some 
malfunctions that caused the EU to punch below its economic and political weight 
(Crowe 2004, Paul 2008). Amongst the problems was the looming risk of 
institutional inconsistency since within both pillars and at various committees people 
would work on the same issue while it seldom resulted in the same policy. This was 
somewhat improved by the installation of a separate High Representative for CFSP 
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in 1999, but it did not completely mitigate the problem due to the reluctance of 
member states to empower this position with ample resources. In short, the 
institutional split in resources and responsibilities impeded the development of a 
proactive and coherent EU foreign policy.  
In addition to the overly complex internal structure, the EU also possessed 
little simplicity in its external representation. For matters within CFSP continuity 
was often lacking because of a rotating presidency within the Council. Every six 
months a new member would head the organ and would change the focus of 
Europe’s foreign policy. This was somewhat improved by the installation of a High 
Representative for CFSP in 1999, but not to a meaningful extent. Moreover, the 
plethora of European institutions with foreign policy responsibilities led to confusion 
in partner countries about whom to approach on what subject. Although the 
Commission was permanently represented in several third countries, it did not 
possess full authority and it allegedly also lacked diplomatic professionalism 
(Spence 2006, Cameron 2007, Missiroli 2007). In short, this diffuse external 
representation impeded the Union in becoming a visible and influential player on the 
international scene and kept Henry Kissinger’s legendary question, “Who do I call 
when I want to talk to Europe?” a relevant issue. 
 
3.4 – A new Framework 
 
The shortcomings of the foreign policy structure, as set up by the Maastricht 
treaty, surfaced quickly after its implementation and became increasingly apparent 
due to the EU’s rise to international prominence, especially in economic terms. Soon 
the need for reform became undeniable and triggered the European heads of state to 
set up the ‘Convention on the future of the Union’ in 2001. This working group was 
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issued to set up a draft constitution for the EU. This unprecedented path towards 
unity aimed generally at reforming the EU’s legal foundations. As to external action 
specifically, the Council asked the Convention to make the Union “stronger in the 
pursuit of its essential objectives and more present in the world.”10  Looking back, 
this assignment initiated a process that would eventually lead to a fundamental 
reorganization of the EU’s foreign policy structure and the set-up of the Union’s own 
body of representation: The External Action Service. 
The Convention presented a draft constitution in July 2003 that would have 
rigorously rearranged the Union’s constellation. Undoubtedly, one of the most 
affected fields of governance by this document would have been the CFSP. 
However, due to the negative referenda outcomes in France and The Netherlands in 
2005, the Union had to go back to the drawing board in order to come up with a 
treaty that was supported by all. The result was a slightly modified document that 
amended the former European treaties instead of the constitutional objective of 
completely replacing them. Signed in Lisbon in 2007, the Reform Treaty 
nevertheless brought key innovations to the foreign policy system of the EU. 
 Undoubtedly, the most important innovations following the Lisbon Treaty are 
the revived position of the High Representative and the creation of the External 
Action Force. However, the altered legal structure of the EU needs to be explained 
first. In effect, the treaty abolished the pillar structure thereby merging the 
supranational Communities and the other intergovernmental bodies into one single 
legal personality. This feature is highly important since it allows the EU to act under 
international law and within international organizations as a single entity. Another 
                                                
10 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15-12-2001. Via www.consilium.europa.eu visited 24-
05-2013.  
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implication of the abandonment of the pillar structure is that the external actions of 
the Commission and the CFSP come closer together. In effect, the same authority 
now governs all foreign policy formulated by the EU. However, the treaty still 
provides a clear distinction between the two pre-existing decision-making regimes. 
The maintained exceptional position of CFSP is pointed out in two 
declarations attached to the treaty. They stipulate that the new European agreement 
does not affect the power of a member state to conduct their own foreign policy and 
that nor the Commission, nor the Parliament obtains more rights in the domain of 
decision initiation.11 Moreover, the updated Title V of the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU), the part of the treaty containing the ‘General Provisions on the 
Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’, prescribes that the former Community method of decision-making12 
is applied to all areas of the Union except to the field of CFSP. Instead this “shall be 
defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council of Ministers 
acting unanimously.”13 Additionally, once decisions are made they do not become an 
EU legislative act, meaning that the European Court of Justice has no jurisdiction 
over the provisions in this area. 
This description indicates that CFSP has remained an intergovernmental 
body. Yet, this specific character could gradually dissolve without having to start the 
elaborate procedure of treaty revision. This is because the Lisbon Treaty authorizes 
the European Council to classify, by unanimity, specific issues to be decided upon 
                                                
11 European Union, Declaration 13 &14 of the Lisbon Treaty, 13-12-2007. Via www.lisbon-treaty.org 
visited 24-05-2013. 
12 This is the EU's usual method of decision-making, in which the Commission makes a proposal to 
the Council and Parliament who then debate it, propose amendments and eventually adopt it as EU 
law. 
13 European Union, Article 24.1 TEU-L.  
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by using qualified majority voting.14 , 15  This dynamic element in CFSP could 
therefore diminish its intergovernmental level, although this heavily relies on the 
approval of the European Council. Furthermore, the treaty allows for the creation of 
enhanced cooperation within the EU, meaning that some member states can choose 
to advance integration in the certain aspects of foreign policy if the other members 
allow them to. Both these provisions have made CFSP into a more flexible organ 
that could turn it into a less intergovernmental system in the near future. 
An indispensible element within CFSP is the ESDP, which was re-baptized 
by the Lisbon Treaty as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Here, the 
updated treaty is very specific in the range of missions that can be carried out in the 
name of the EU:16 
• Humanitarian and rescue tasks 
• Conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks 
• Tasks of combat forces in crisis-management 
• Joint disarmament operations 
• Military advice and assistance tasks 
• Post-conflict stabilization tasks 
Besides these issues concerning extraterritorial tasks of the EU, the treaty also added 
a mutual defense clause and a solidarity clause which both enter into force 
automatically in case of an attack on one of the EU members.17 Aside from these 
somewhat exceptional cases, all CSDP decisions are made in the Council by 
unanimity. Here, the treaty provides neither exceptions nor any room for adjustment.    
                                                
14 The current qualified majority is 255 out of a total of 345 weighed votes and representing a 
majority of the Member States. Moreover, a Member State may request verification that the QM 
represents at least 62% of the total population of the Union. 
15 European Union, Article 31.1 TEU-L. 
16 European Union, Article 42 TEU-L. 
17 Idem. 
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Adding up the above stated features of CFSP under the Lisbon Treaty, one 
could argue that the abolished intergovernmental pillar remains in place. Also when 
analyzing the provisions of CFSP as assigned by the treaty, the unique nature of the 
organ becomes clear. According to the new legal framework the Union either has 
exclusive, shared, supportive, coordinative or supplementary competence in a field 
of governance.18 However, CFSP is mentioned outside this categorization of EU 
authority, again indicating its specific position in the overall framework. As a result 
of the marginal supranationalization of CFSP, much of the attention was drawn to 
the other innovations that were introduced by the treaty of Lisbon. 
 
3.5 – The High Representative as the New Face of Europe 
 
The first key innovation was the reinforcement of the position responsible for 
Europe’s external policy. Whereas the draft constitution opted for a Union Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon had to settle for the somewhat less weighty title of High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security (HR). This position 
combines the former offices of the High Representative for CFSP and that of the EU 
Commissioner for external relations. This “double-hat” is a revolutionary 
improvement since it aims at overcoming the gap between the on-going external 
affairs of the former Community and the more nationally politicized issues of CFSP. 
Additionally, it aims to improve the consistency of Europe’s foreign policy and 
contributes to the unitary representation of the Union in third countries and 
organizations. 
Following the merger of the CFSP position and that of the Commissioner, the 
HR thus requires a dual mandate. Subsequently, a qualified majority among the 
                                                
18 European Union, Article 2 TFEU. 
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heads of state in the European Council appoints the HR. This person then has to be 
approved by the President of the Commission and also requires a vote of consent in 
the Parliament. When taking up the position, the HR is both chairperson of the CFSP 
meetings and EU Commissioner of external affairs. Additionally, he or she becomes 
the vice-president of the Commission. In practice, these functions allocate a lot of 
power to a single independent EU posting. However, in legal terms the member 
states have made sure that this person does not possess effective legal power by 
withholding the HR a right to vote in CFSP.  
In effect, the Lisbon Treaty assigns the HR with a wide range of tasks. In the 
first place the HR has great influence on the direction of CFSP since the position 
holds the right of initiative and has the obligation to prepare the meetings in the 
Council. Furthermore, the HR has the right to call for extraordinary meetings and 
can also assign priority to certain topics. Considering that the CSDP is an element of 
CFSP, the HR thus also possesses these rights in military issues. Moreover, as 
foreign policy chief, the HR coordinates the common civilian and military missions. 
Taking into account that the term for this position is five years one could claim that, 
although the HR might not take part in decision-making, the position provides the 
opportunity to shape EU foreign policy through other channels and to rise up as an 
influential political figure.   
Another important task of the HR is to work towards a workable and 
meaningful compromise in matters of CFSP. This demands diplomatic skill and 
persistence. These abilities are also needed in ensuring consistency in policy both 
horizontally, as compared with work of other commissioners that involves external 
aspects, and vertically, meaning that compliance of the members is guaranteed. This 
last task is a tricky one since the HR does not have any instruments to inflict this. 
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Consequently, implementation of policy thus also falls under the responsibilities of 
the HR. According to the Lisbon Treaty the HR is expected to conduct, carry out, 
and put into effect CFSP as mandated by the Council.19 Besides these duties within 
the EU, the HR also figures as the single voice of foreign affairs while representing 
the EU in meetings with third parties. The treaty provides the position with a 
mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Union and to act within international 
organizations.20       
 This job description indicates that with this position come great 
responsibilities. Moreover, one could claim that the entire successfulness of the 
Lisbon Treaty depends on the capacity and skill of the HR. In the first place because 
the balancing of activities between the Council and the Commission is already 
institutionally complicated thus constituting a very delicate assignment in practice as 
well. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty still allocates the right of representing the 
Union to three entities, namely the HR, the Commission and the rotating Presidency 
of the Council meaning that much comes down to the personal willingness of the HR 
to claim the spot in the limelight. Additionally, a great deal of pragmatism and 
diplomatic skill is demanded from this post in order for the CFSP to produce 
significant policies that in turn will decide whether or not the EU can become an 
effective global actor. This adds up to an almost impossible workload. Luckily the 
member states have decided to setup an important supportive institute with a 
substantial budget. This will supply the much-needed assistance for the HR to 
execute the job successfully.  
 
                                                
19 European Union, Article 18 TEU-L. 
20 European Union, Article 27 TEU-L. 
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3.6 – A European Diplomatic Service 
 
Since the member states have traditionally been reluctant to allocate 
resources to Brussels in the field of foreign policy, the formation of a distinct 
European diplomatic force can be considered a revolutionary step in the maturing of 
European foreign policy. As requested by declaration 15 of the Treaty of Lisbon the 
EU began preparatory work on the creation of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) directly after the signing of the document and eventually led to its official 
launch in December 2010. This service was created to assist the HR in the multitude 
of tasks that were directed towards that desk. The member states underlined the 
importance of this new organ by allocating a budget of around 500 million euro’s in 
2011,21 which has slightly gone up in the subsequent years. In characterizing the new 
service several analyses concluded that its powers and resources make the EEAS a 
unique institution that is neither intergovernmental nor completely supranational 
(Van Vooren 2010, Helwig and Stroß 2011). This is reflected by both its internal and 
external setup. 
  When analyzing the internal setup it is of great importance to emphasize that 
the EEAS was placed in between the Commission and the Council. After all, one of 
the main goals of the Lisbon Treaty was to overcome this gap between both EU 
foreign policy actors. Examining the Council decision establishing the organization 
and functioning of the EEAS of July 26, 2010 this unique internal setup comes to the 
fore. Article 1.2 states that:  
 
“The EEAS, which has its headquarters in Brussels, shall be a functionally 
autonomous body of the EU, separate from the General Secretariat of the 
                                                
21 BBC, Q&A EU External Action Service, 07-12-2010. Via http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ visited 28-
05-2013. 
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Council and from the Commission with the legal capacity necessary to 
perform its tasks and attain its objectives.”22 
 
In effect, this independent position and bridging location enables the EEAS to build 
consistency in the EU’s external relations (Mauri and Gya 2009). 
 With the creation of the EEAS came a reallocation of offices. Both from the 
Council and the Commission directories were transferred to the new service. (For the 
complete overview see Appendix A.) The incorporation into the EEAS of former 
Council administrations, such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate 
and the European Military Staff, is of specific interest since it signifies a shift away 
from the intergovernmental Council and a move towards the new hybrid 
organization. However, there were also departments formerly belonging to the 
supranational Commission transferred to the EEAS. The most significant in this 
respect is the large Directorate-General for External Relations; this includes the 
Commission delegations in third countries. Although this might seem as a relapse of 
European authority, it is an understandable decision taking into account that it will 
avoid double structures and it increases efficiency of the EU activities (Avery 2009). 
Nevertheless, significant policy areas such as trade, development and humanitarian 
aid remain under the control of the Commission meaning that 
“decommunitarization” was minimized. 
 According to Article 6 of the Council Decision, the EEAS delegates are 
expected to act in the interest of the Union alone. Moreover, they may not take 
instructions from anyone outside the EEAS and they must operate in full service of 
                                                
22 European Union, Council Decision (2010/427/EU),  26-07-2010. Via http://www.eeas.europa.eu 
visited 28-05-2013. 
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the HR.23 Overall, this job description and the reallocation of offices signifies that 
the creation of the EEAS has led to a decrease of intergovernmentalism in the field 
of European foreign policy. As a result, this development indicates that, although the 
member states maintain their absolute voting rights and no hard power is allocated to 
European institutions, foreign policy becomes increasingly “Brusselized” (Helwig 
and Stroß 2011). 
 When analyzing the external setup of the EEAS, meaning its relationship 
with other EU institutions, it becomes clear that also here intergovernmental 
structures might be slowly eroding. Central in this claim is the role of the European 
Parliament, Europe’s supranational institution par excellence. Although the EP does 
not possess any important authority when it comes down to foreign policy, it did 
however succeed in claiming some power through the marginal influence it does 
enjoy. By threatening to reject the EEAS budget and the entire proposed diplomatic 
officials in 2009, the EP pressured the already appointed HR, Catherine Ashton, to 
include the Parliament in several issues relating the EEAS.24 As a result, the EP now 
has the full budgetary oversight over the service and is increasingly involved in the 
area of CFSP through consultation in the form of regular meetings. Moreover, the 
EEAS is now politically accountable to the Parliament, something that was not 
included beforehand.25 It is undeniable that these developments have extended the 
influence of the supranational EP in the daily operating of the EEAS, albeit only 
slightly.          
                                                
23 European Union, Council Decision (2010/427/EU), 26-07-2010. Via http://www.eeas.europa.eu 
visited 28-05-2013. 
24 European Voice, MEPs seek more power over diplomatic service 15-10-2009. Via 
www.europeanvoice.com visited 30-05-2013. 
25 European Union, Declaration by the High Representative on political accountability, 09-07-2010. 
Via www.europarl.europa.eu visited 30-05-2013. 
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The collaboration between the HR and the EEAS has allowed the EU to 
become more effective as a global actor that is involved in a wide range of foreign 
activities. Now, for example, the EU operates as a single entity in peace-building 
mission around the world, specifically in former-Yugoslavia. Here the EU aims to 
help the countries reconcile with their past in order to build a sustainable future. 
Another example is that the EU is now acting as a single actor in finding a resolution 
for the Arab-Israeli conflict, because the members unanimously support the two-state 
solution. Additionally, the EU speaks with one voice when it comes down to 
initiatives battling climate change and aims to become a leading player on this issue. 
Also, due to the inclusion of CSDP in the CFSP, the EEAS and the HR work as 
security officials that coordinate civilian and military operations worldwide such as 
the large mission tackling piracy off the coast of Somalia.  
 
3.7 – Europe’s General Foreign Objectives 
 
The new institutional framework of Europe’s foreign policy mechanism and 
the collaboration between the EEAS and the HR were among the biggest 
implications of the Treaty of Lisbon. The member states hereby clearly decided to 
push forward for an increasingly common foreign policy that would enable the EU to 
become an efficient and global actor. In institutional reform this meant that external 
representation became more uniform, policy instruments became more integrated 
and policies more coherent. With this new structure came new goals. In order to 
grow towards a global actor, the Treaty of Lisbon provided objectives for the new 
diplomatic apparatus. Additionally, the Council, the Commission and the High 
Representative set up goals during the inaugural years of the new structure. 
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 Title V of the newly amended Treaty on European Union (TEU) deals with 
the Union ‘s external action and defines a set of objectives in Article 21.2: 
a) Safeguarding its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and 
integrity. 
b) Consolidating and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
the principles of international law. 
c) Preserving peace, preventing conflict and strengthening international 
security. 
d) Fostering sustainable economic, social and environmental development in 
developing countries. 
e) Encouraging the integration of all countries into the world economy through 
abolishing trade restrictions. 
f) Promoting an international system based on multilateral cooperation and 
good governance. 
Besides these goals the article also emphasizes the importance of environmental 
protection and the necessity of humanitarian aid in case of a natural or man-made 
disaster.26 Regarding that the Lisbon Treaty placed them in the framework of the 
TEU it is considered that these goals are to be linked to the CFSP model of EU 
foreign policy.  
The EU’s other external objectives, more related to the former Community 
method, are specified in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), which replaced the Treaty establishing the European Community. This 
treaty is a considerable part of the Lisbon Treaty and sets out the Union’s external 
affairs in part five. Although the opening Article emphasizes that all EU action in 
                                                
26 European Union, Article 21 TEU-L. 
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this framework has to comply with the principles and objectives as lay down in Title 
V of the amended TEU, the remainder of the document sums up the goals more 
specifically.27 In it issues such as the EU’s common commercial policy and the 
Union’s policies on development and humanitarian aid are stipulated. Due to their 
rather detailed nature and minor relevance to the remainder of this research they will 
not be summarized here.     
However, there are also other documents of interest that set out the EU’s 
objectives for foreign policy. First and foremost is the European Security Strategy of 
former Commissioner of CFSP Javier Solana. The Council adopted it in 2003, six 
years before the Treaty of Lisbon, and is still in force today. Solana felt that at the 
time the EU was facing a rapidly changing world with which came new challenges 
and threats. In it prominent attention was paid to the importance of building security 
in the EU’s direct neighborhood. The report stipulated that due to technological 
innovation and globalization a new threat evolved in the form of dynamic non-state 
entities. It concluded that therefore it is in Europe’s direct interest to promote good-
governance in the world and more specifically in its direct environment. As a result, 
the document proposed to enhance engagement with the southern-Mediterranean and 
the neighbors in the East by setting up a partnership that includes economic, security 
and cultural cooperation.28   
 The Council took this recommendation to heart as they approved the 
development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. Over the years 
this structure has worked as a bilateral process between the EU and the partner 
country in order to attain its main objective: “avoiding the emergence of new 
dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and instead strengthening 
                                                
27 European Union, Article 205 TFEU-L. 
28 J. Solana, European Security Strategy, 12-12-2003. Via www.consilium.europa.eu visited 30-05-
2013. 
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the prosperity, stability and security of all.”29 For that to happen the EU has 
identified four policy areas that support this goal: 
• People: Promote employment and social cohesion. 
• Peace: Cooperate on countering terrorism. 
• Democracy: Strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights.  
• Economy: Promote market reforms 
Essential in this process is the bilateral ENP Action Plan on which both parties 
agree. The Action Plan is a tailor made agreement that sets out the agenda of 
reforms, articulates priorities and determines the package of support. In 2008 the 
ENP underwent a slight institutional change, as the organ became the overall 
organization that covers both the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern 
Partnership. The ENP as a bilateral mechanism remained in place, but now also 
accommodated two multilateral institutions. Today, the ENP is incorporated in the 
EEAS and takes up a significant chunk of the service’s capacity. The EEAS and the 
HR are the key actors in this structure since it operates outside of the CFSP model.     
 
3.8 – Conclusion 
 
Today it is almost inconceivable to see Europe fall back into bloody conflicts 
similar to those that dominated the continent for centuries. This durable peace and 
stability can be accredited to the project of European cooperation to a significant 
extent. More than fifty years after the foundational Treaty of Rome the project has 
grown both territorially and institutionally and finds itself today in the shape of the 
European Union. The recurrent meetings and subsequent treaties signify that the EU 
is an on-going project looking to improve its effectiveness both internally and 
                                                
29 EEAS website. Via http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/ visited 31-05-2013. 
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externally. An interesting element in this institution building has been the trajectory 
of European cooperation in the field of foreign affairs. The above provided overview 
points out that this is a controversial subject of integration that has resulted in an 
unconventional structure of cooperation.    
 Clearly, the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty marked a watershed in 
the EU’s approach to common foreign policy since it’s main innovations were in the 
aspect of governance. The end of the pillar structure and the confirmation of EU’s 
single legal personality meant that the Union now speaks with a single voice. That 
single voice is currently Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security. She is supported by the EEAS, a new diplomatic 
structure that has taken up most of the foreign affairs activities that were first either 
Council or Commission responsibilities. However revolutionary its ambitions were, 
the Lisbon Treaty did not abolish the absolute power of the member state since 
decisions of great importance are still taken by unanimity. As a result much will 
depend on the personality and skillfulness of the HR and the effectiveness of the 
EEAS. 
 Both face an enormous assignment in making the EU the global actor it 
aspires to be. Several EU documents have provided them with the Union’s general 
objectives and principles. In addition, a significant budget has been given to them in 
order to attain these goals. Now that this structure has been in place for little over 
two years there are already signs of a more coherent and decisive strategy in some 
aspects of EU foreign policy. However, considering the aim of this research the most 
interesting EU activities in foreign policy are the ones aimed at the Union’s southern 
neighbors. It is clear that the tumultuous political change that has swept the area in 
recent years is an unnerving development that demands a clear European position. 
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The structure provided by the Lisbon Treaty should enable the HR and the EEAS to 
make a significant impact in a region that will define the successfulness of this new 
mechanism to a large extent.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EU AND THE ARAB UPRISINGS 
 
4.1 – Introduction 
 
The EEAS started its activities on the first of December 2010. However, this 
particular month will not be remembered as the month in which Europe became a 
diplomatic entity. No, this particular month the whole world was watching the 
people of North Africa rise up against their dictatorial leaders. What started as a 
small demonstration in a rural town in Tunisia eventually became a massive popular 
movement unparalleled by any protest in the region’s post-World War era. Suddenly 
Europe found out that its once so steady southern neighbor countries harbored a 
people deeply dissatisfied with their governing systems. The resulting uprisings 
caused the collapse of three long lasting regimes in North Africa. Ben Ali, Gaddafi 
and Mubarak were ousted from their presidential positions in Tunisia, Libya and 
Egypt respectively. The revolutionary spirit travelled across the Arab world leading 
media and observers to call this transformation “the Arab Spring”. 
 This development meant that the EU saw the governments of some of its 
partners change dramatically. Moreover, the rapid overthrow of the autocrats meant 
that the Union now directly bordered a region of great instability. However, several 
European observers pointed out that this historic event opened up real opportunities 
for the EU to rise up as a foreign policy actor (D’Alema 2011, Koch 2011, 
Schumacher 2011). Since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 and the subsequent changes in 
the EU foreign policy structure, expectations were that the EU would demonstrate a 
more coherent and common foreign policy towards these countries. In the end, the 
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EEAS and the bolstered position of the High Representative were created in order to 
respond to situations such as these. It is therefore no surprise that over the last two 
years this new foreign policy structure of the EU has dedicated most of its time to the 
political transitions in the Arab world. As a result, the Arab uprisings provide the 
perfect framework for a critical review of the activities of the EEAS and the 
functioning of the HR.  
  In order to keep this research within limits, this chapter will mainly focus on 
the European policies towards Libya and Egypt. Both these countries underwent a 
major political transition since their autocratic leaders had to make way for 
reformists who have changed the country’s government fundamentally and will most 
likely continue to do so. However, this is where the parallel comparison stops since 
Egypt’s and Libya’s revolutionary processes and aftermaths differ greatly. This 
forced the EU to setup two very distinct strategies including military, governance, 
economic and social aspects. In addition, the geopolitical importance of both 
countries to the EU make that these two cases are the most appropriate for an in-
depth analysis of European foreign policy. 
 The first part of this chapter will look at the EU’s initial and general response 
to the Arab uprisings. Considering that the events coincided with the inaugural 
period of the EEAS it will be of great interest to see what the objectives and 
ambitions of the new institution were at its outset. As a result, an overview of 
Europe’s strategy towards the changed region will be provided. Naturally, a 
significant part of these documents are aimed towards the internal structures of the 
EU. Subsequently, this research analyses the EU policies towards the two specific 
countries. First the case of Egypt will be discussed, followed by that of Libya. 
Whereas the priority in the policies concerning Egypt lay at economic and 
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humanitarian reform, in Libya more attention is paid to security and institution 
building. In both cases this research will focus on policy objectives, implementation 
and effectiveness.  
  
4.2 – The Revolutions of 2011 
 
Since its launch in 2004 the European Neighborhood Policy has tried to 
enhance development and prosperity in the southern Mediterranean by encouraging 
integration and trade between Europe and its neighbors. The idea behind it was to 
create a prosperous and thus more peaceful and stable Arab world that could 
guarantee the security of Europe. The events of early 2011 that expressed the deep 
discontent of the people with the status-quo reminded the EU that these policies had 
achieved very little and pointed out that a new strategy with a radically different 
approach was needed. However, the EU does not have a reputation of being an agile 
and flexible organization. This led some scholars to ask the question: Can the 
leopard change its spots (Behr 212)?  
 This question also refers to the traditional supportive stand of the EU towards 
the former dictatorial regimes of North Africa. Over the years, while initially 
preaching for political reforms and the development of a civil society, the ENP had 
increasingly moved towards facilitating the continuation of the status quo. This was 
mainly the result of Europe’s priority of regional stability over democratization and 
possible political unrest. In effect, the initial normative agenda lost against the 
Union’s security and economic interests, a reality that was happily exploited by the 
Arab autocrats (Bicchi 2011). Consequently, during the years leading up to the 
eventual revolutions, the EU set up small initiatives of good governance and projects 
fostering economic reform that were aimed at creating conditions for sustainable 
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democratization. Yet, these policies were never aimed at destabilizing the regimes 
and often even cemented the political status quo (Kienle 2005, Behr 2012). 
 The wave of protests that started in December 2010 surprised the world and 
caught the EU off-guard. Not only was the EU at the time in the middle of starting 
up its new foreign policy structure, it had also neglected its connections with the 
Arab countries since ENP summits with the Mediterranean partners had been 
repeatedly postponed. In addition, Europe had to consider its position vis-à-vis the 
demonstrations keeping in mind its relationships with the autocrats. As a result, the 
EU was slow to respond to the events in Tunisia, the first country to experience 
massive protests. It was actually only after the ousting of President Ben Ali that HR 
Catherine Ashton issued a statement expressing EU’s “support and recognition to the 
Tunisian people and their democratic aspirations.”30 
The successful revolution in Tunisia fuelled the spirit of the protestors in 
neighboring North African countries, primarily in Egypt. This push not only 
intensified the popular uprising but also altered the European position towards 
President Mubarak. On January 27, 2011, almost three weeks before the eventual fall 
of Mubarak, Ashton sided with the protestors and called for an end of the violence 
against civilians.31 Both these statements indicate that at the time the EEAS and the 
HR purely reacted to the events in the area. Nevertheless, the EU recognized that a 
complete revision of its approach to the region was needed.  
 On February 4, with protests underway in both Libya and Egypt, the Council 
stated in a declaration addressed to the region that the EU is determined “to lend its 
full support to the transition processes towards democratic governance, pluralism, 
                                                
30 Joint statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner Stefan 
Fule on the event in Tunisia, 14-01-2011. Via http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ visited 01-06-2013. 
31 Statement by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on events in Egypt, 27-01-2011. Via 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ visited 01-06-2013. 
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improved opportunities for economic prosperity and social inclusion, and 
strengthened regional stability.”32 In the same document the Council also requested 
the HR to come up with a series of measures in order to support these processes and 
asked the EEAS to revise the policies within the ENP. Catherine Ashton 
acknowledged the urge for change by responding that Europe had to drop its old 
strategy of stability in order to pursue a policy of democratic progression in the 
region. These statements from the Council signified the beginning of a more prolific 
and central role of EU institutions in the interaction between the two regions. 
 Meanwhile, in these first couple of months of the regional uprisings the EU 
had already undertaken several measures as an immediate response to the events. 
The Commission ordered a humanitarian aid package of 30 million Euros to assist in 
direct needs. Moreover, it bolstered its project along the borders in order to cope 
with the flow of migrants wanting to cross the Mediterranean. In this aspect extra 
operations were executed and the European External Border Fund and the Refugee 
Fund received an extra budget of 25 million Euros. During this period the HR, in 
cooperation with her EEAS, worked towards a more long-term approach towards the 
changed Arab neighbors.       
  
4.3 – A Constructive European Response 
  
In effect, the revolutions allowed the EU to return to a bilateral policy 
focused on democratic values instead of just stability. The first document to 
emphasize a structural difference in Europe’s approach to the Southern 
Mediterranean was published on March 8, 2011 in the form of “A Partnership for 
Democratic and Shared Prosperity”. This supportive program consists of three 
                                                
32 European Council, Declaration on Egypt and the region. 04-02-2011. Via 
www.consilium.europa.eu visited 02-06-2013. 
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pillars: One, democratic transformation and institution-building; Two, making a 
difference on a personal level, with the specific emphasis on civil society 
improvements especially for the young; and Three, developing sustainable economic 
growth through support for education projects and small and medium sized 
enterprises. 33  Additionally, this statement announced that the ENP would be 
fundamentally reviewed in order to build a new foundation for a future partnership.   
As a result, the HR, in collaboration with the Commission, issued an official 
communiqué on the changes in the ENP in May 2011 called “A New Response to a 
Changing Neighbourhood”. In it Ashton addressed both the Member States and the 
partner countries in order to emphasize this new time of opportunity. Towards the 
Member States she stipulated that:  
 
“The Lisbon Treaty provides the EU with a unique opportunity to become a 
more effective actor. Nowhere is this more relevant than in our 
neighborhood. But rising to the challenge requires that EU and Member 
States policies be much more closely aligned than in the past, in order to 
deliver the common message and the coherence that will make our actions 
effective. EU instruments and policies will be effective only if properly 
backed by Member States policies. Business as usual is no longer an option if 
we want to make our neighborhood a safer place and protect our interests.”34  
 
Even more significant was her announcement of the new unilaterally declared 
strategy of the ENP. With this document Catherine Ashton and the Commission 
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launched the “more-for-more” policy, which entails that the southern partners will 
receive more support from the EU if they demonstrate willingness and progress 
towards democratic reforms. This new approach implied that the EU would now 
pursue a policy that would differentiate amongst the partner countries. In order for 
the new governments to profit from this new strategy the EU demands as an entry 
qualification “a commitment to adequately monitored, free and fair elections.”35 
From there on, the partner’s efforts to align with the values and norms of the EU 
would be awarded with increased support. This enhanced support could come in the 
form of increased funding for economic development or institution-building, greater 
access to the European market or greater mobility for people to move in-and-out the 
EU. This package became known as “The Three Ms”; Money, Mobility and Markets.  
The document however also included a warning that governments violating human 
rights or reversing democratic reforms could see sanctions targeted upon them.          
 This new strategy relies on the Joint Action Plan between the partner and the 
EU, making this ENP mechanism more important than it was before. Based on these 
Action Plans, which figure as an indicator of progress, countries can be granted 
support in the form of one of the ‘M’s, or a combination thereof. In financial terms 
the EU made available a large sum for assistance during the transformation. In 
addition to the already available 5.7 billion Euros for ENP projects in the period 
2011-2013, the Commission allocated an extra 1,2 billion Euros for the same 
period.36 With the new budget and the more-for-more strategy came the need for a 
separate organ to disburse the funds. As a result the Support to Partnership, Reform 
and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) program was set up in September 2011. This 
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agency controls a folder of grants and allocates them to partner countries showing 
sustained commitment to democratic reforms. 
 Concerning markets, the EU offers partner countries that demonstrate 
democratic transformation an improvement in their access to the vast European 
market. This means that the trade barriers frustrating Arab export to flow to Europe 
will be reduced if the ENP decides so. Furthermore, a program of increased market 
integration can be set up that could eventually evolve into the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). This projected free trade area goes 
beyond the removing of barriers and will aim towards an enhanced trade 
cooperation. Regarding mobility, the EU is willing to open up and facilitate visas for 
civilians from countries demonstrating a shared understanding of values and norms. 
Additionally, Catherine Ashton has appointed an EU Special Representative for the 
Southern Mediterranean in order to maintain in political dialogue and ensure optimal 
coordination of EU efforts.       
These initiatives indicate that the EU is genuinely occupied with the events 
and developments in the Arab region. Still, these initiatives have been criticized for 
not supplying clear defined reforms and goals that will result in rewards 
(Schumacher 2011). This leaves a rather vague impression of what is expected form 
the Arab countries and a need for clear benchmarking might be essential to the 
success of the project (Behr 2011). Conversely, other have welcomed its vagueness 
since it expresses a sort of assurance in the new governments that they share the 
same ideas and that they need to be put in effect in their own ways outside the 
European definition (Frattini 2011).  
Yet, one can identify European priorities. One of them is the support and 
enhancement of civil society organizations. The Union sees them as key players in 
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creating accountability thereby shaping the future political environment. Another 
often heard term in EU rhetoric about the Arab transformation is the need for “deep 
democracy”. HR Ashton coined this term to emphasize that democracy is much more 
than elections. According to her this term encompasses respect for the rule of law, 
freedom of speech, respect for human rights, an independent judiciary and impartial 
administration.37 According to the EU these aspects should guarantee a sustainable 
democratic system. However, a clear interchange between achieving goals and 
awarding set rewards was not defined.  
Now more than two years after the revolutions, one could see a significant 
move towards democracy in North Africa. In February 2013 the Commission 
summarized the state-of-play after two years of the new EU-Arab interaction. It 
emphasized the positive developments such as the successfully held democratic 
elections in North Africa and the abolishment of several restrictive laws on freedom 
of expression or assembly. However, it also warned that security challenges remain 
present and that a deteriorating economic situation is leading to social tensions. In 
turn these tensions can become a serious threat to the social cohesion of the already 
fragile countries and can impede the democratic transition. This memo therefore 
stresses that continued EU support is essential to the future of the region.38 
Two recent EU statements emphasize this expression of continued need for 
support to neighboring countries. Institutionally, the EU underlined the importance 
of civil society support by establishing the European Endowment for Democracy in 
October 2012. This agency aims to help political parties, non-registered NGOs, trade 
unions and other social partners to promote democracy as well as respect for human 
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rights and the rule of law. It offers a rapid and flexible funding mechanism for 
important carriers of democratic values that operate in a very uncertain political 
context. Although it now operates autonomous from the EU, this agency maintains a 
close relationship with the EEAS and is largely dependent on EU funding.39        
Furthermore, the EU is looking to finalize its budget for the period 2014-
2020 and has included a significant increase in ENP funding to 18 billion Euros. 
Compared to the budget 2007-2013, the requested amount includes an increase of 
approximately 40%.40  Although the negotiations are still running and are likely to be 
difficult considering the economic hardship in the whole Union, it indicates that EU 
officials see the transformation of the neighborhood as a top-priority in EU affairs 
for the coming years. In order to understand what these initiatives mean and how the 
abovementioned strategy is used in practice, this thesis now turns to an analysis of 
their implementation in Egypt and Libya.    
  
4.4 – The Case of Egypt 
 
4.4.1 – Introduction 
 
When the protests started on Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011 the EU was 
ill prepared for a transition in an important partner country in the region. Moreover, 
the EU and former autocratic President Hosni Mubarak had maintained close ties for 
decades. This was emphasized by the appointment of Mubarak as Co-President of 
the multilateral Union for the Mediterranean, which was launched in 2008. 
Following the events in Tunisia, the revolutionary spirit swept through Egypt and 
produced massive protests in late January 2011. After the experience of Tunisia, the 
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EU envisaged the coming situation and dropped its support for the regime and called 
for free and fair election through a statement on January 31.41 Yet, it did not directly 
demand Mubarak’s resignation, thereby stopping short of the US official position. In 
light of the abovementioned altered ENP strategy, the EU changed course and made 
the successful democratic transition in Egypt a top priority. In it both political and 
economic interests were at stake for both parties.42 
4.4.2 – Egypt in Transition 
 
With the ousting of the regime came a transitional authority that would 
supervise the period towards the first free democratic presidential elections in the 
country. However, this transitional government, in the form of The Supreme Court 
of the Armed Forces, did not necessarily welcome all European proposals and did 
not comply with a series of EU preconditions for full support. Under their rule Egypt 
experienced troubled times in which the external actors often found themselves 
sidelined.  
 The EU’s primary concern in Egypt was the repeated beating down by 
security forces of protest activities that continued to appear in the period leading up 
to the elections. During that time thousands of activists were arbitrarily detained and 
trialed before military courts. These events were constantly condemned by the EU 
officials and raised concerns about the support for democratic transition among the 
military leaders. Similarly, the EU was very concerned about the restrictions that 
were placed upon civil society organizations. Several NGO’s were expelled or 
ordered to cease their activities, which led the HR and the Council to demand for 
“the adoption of a new law that would be consistent with Egypt’s international 
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obligations.”43 Another prominent point of concern of the EU was the Egyptian 
rejection of a full-fledged electoral observation mission for both the parliamentary as 
well as the presidential elections. In addition to this, the transitional authorities were 
hesitant in responding to EU long-term initiatives. For example, preparatory talks on 
a mobility partnership were halted and also an EU initiative to begin integrating the 
Egyptian economy into the single European market was turned down by the 
Egyptian caretaker government.  
 Nonetheless, the EU continued to financially support projects of which it 
believed that they were able to make a positive impact in Egyptian society. 
Immediately after the revolution the EU approved to respond to the Egyptian 
people’s request in order to protect civil, political and socio-economic rights and 
launched a 20 million Euros civil society package. This direct response was followed 
up by a series of financial aid programs that amounted to a total of 132 million Euros 
for the year of 2011. Among the receiving parties were organizations intending to 
increase political participation and electoral awareness as well as agricultural 
businesses in need of support. Furthermore, the EU extended a 900 million Euro loan 
to the country via the European Investment Bank. In the meantime the EU remained 
very active in seeking contact with the new government, which is expressed by the 
multiple visits of HR Ashton to Cairo.  
Still, the overall impression is that the EU did not succeed in transferring its 
democratic hopes and ideas for Egypt to the transitional authorities who held 
external influence largely at bay. This sentiment is shared by the independent think-
tank called The European Council on Foreign Relations who pointed out in their 
scorecard on the EU’s foreign policy efforts of 2011 that the Union presented itself 
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as a soft actor in the case of Egypt. The EU did not succeed in pressuring the army to 
agree to certain legal changes, most notably concerning NGO’s, while it continued to 
provide financial aid. It must however be noted that the amount of resources 
committed were maybe insufficient to create any real leverage.44  
The EU itself conceded to these shortcomings in their ENP Country Progress 
Report on 2011, but emphasized that it was a difficult year for both parties since it 
was a year of transition in Egypt and an inaugural year of the new ENP strategy. 
Adding to it that it was also the EEAS its first full year of operation and was still 
trying to find its way, the modest results were to be expected. Consequently, the 
progress report urged Egypt to implement a list of reforms that already featured in 
the first and only EU-Egypt Action Plan of 2007: 45 
• Ensure that all powers are handed over to a civilian administration and that 
the state of emergency is fully lifted before the presidential elections. 
• Draft and adopt a democratic constitution that enshrines respect for human 
rights. 
• Discontinue the use of military courts to judge civilians. 
• Create the conditions conducive to an active and independent NGO 
community and adopt NGO legislation in full compliance with international 
standards. 
• Preserve the freedom of religion and protect minorities. 
• Design and implement an Economic Reform Programme that ensures macro-
economic stability and strengthens public finance management, in order to 
open the door to international financial assistance.  
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4.4.3 – The EU and Morsi’s Egypt 
In June 2012 Egypt elected its new President, Mohammed Morsi, in a 
historical election that ended autocratic leadership. This event was obviously 
welcomed by the European officials who in turn congratulated the Egyptian people 
on a successful free and fair election that could pave the way to a new and 
cooperative relationship between the Union and Egypt. The election victory of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the inauguration of Morsi signified an opportunity for the 
EU to try again to get Egypt involved in its envisioned democratic future of the 
country, something that it clearly failed to achieve during the short ruling of the 
armed forces.  
 This new era started on a positive note as the emergency law, which was in 
place for decades, was abolished just in time for the presidential elections. 
Consequently, the authority in Egypt was transferred to a civilian government led by 
the Muslim Brotherhood. This means that the EU now deals with an Islamist party in 
its direct neighborhood, something they have little experience in. Soon after his 
election as President, Muhammad Morsi visited Brussels in order to exchange ideas 
about the next steps for Egypt and the role the EU could play in this. Both sides then 
and there decided to continue their relationship based on the Association Agreement 
of 2004, which forms the official legal basis governing their relationship, and to 
uphold the ENP Action Plan of 2007. The upside of holding on to these older 
documents is that the continuity of the relationship is being protected and that 
ongoing processes aren’t impeded. Conversely, one can also claim that, given the 
fact that the EU enjoyed close ties with the autocratic regime, this agreement did not 
signify a clear break from history on the side of the EU. Issuing a statement 
declaring that the EU and Egypt would enter a new era based on new documents 
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governing that altered relationship could have made a positive impact.      
During that same meeting, Ashton and Morsi agreed to organize an EU-
Egypt Task Force in November 2012. The Task Force is a new form of EU 
diplomacy and results directly from the work of the EEAS. This specific two-day 
meeting included over 500 participants from both the Egyptian and European public 
and the private sector. During the summit both sides traded ideas and initiatives in 
order to reinvigorate the Egyptian economy, while also human rights and governance 
aspects were discussed. In the end the EU, together with its companies, committed to 
a total budget of nearly 5 billion Euros in loans and grants.46 This meeting thereby 
not only provided just financial aid, it also created a structural bilateral cooperation 
between the two in which both hold their responsibilities. 
4.4.4 – Deep Democracy versus Deep Differences 
 
Besides the abovementioned improvements, the EU found itself disappointed 
in the new government all too often. The ENP country report on 2012 points out that 
compared to the report on 2011, several key-issues were still not addressed. The 
element of most concern to the EU was the lack of improvement in the treatment of 
civil society organizations and NGO’s working in Egypt. What began as a 
crackdown by the transitional government on NGO’s in December 2011, continued 
to dominate the European diplomatic efforts for the rest of the year. Europe had high 
hopes that under the civilian led government, which experienced similar treatment 
under the Mubarak-regime, prosecutions and further suppression would stop. 
However, this was not the case. This issue was not only a concern in 2012 but 
continues to put the bilateral relations with Europe, and Egypt’s international 
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position altogether, in jeopardy today. 47, 48  
It seems that the repeated demand of the EU and other organizations for 
Egypt to create conditions favorable to an active and independent NGO community 
has fallen on deaf ears. A recent civil society bill that is endorsed by President Morsi 
has moved Egypt further away from the international standards of NGO legislation. 
The new bill places tight restrictions on civil society groups and makes it even harder 
for foreign organizations to operate in the country. In effect, the new law provides 
extensive control over the registration, funding and activities of NGO’s to a newly 
formed committee consisting of state officials and intelligence agents. Indications 
are that fundraising activities in particular will be reviewed and that Egyptian human 
rights organizations, which receive 95 percent of their funding from foreign sources, 
will be heavily affected.49 According to President Morsi this is needed in order to 
protect “the Egyptian society from foreign dangers.”50 
In addition to this restrictive civil society law, the Egyptian court recently 
sentenced 43 Egyptian, European and American NGO staff members working for 
different secular organizations to prison terms of up to five years.51 This combination 
of events led HR Ashton to issue an official response stating that: 
 
“The High Representative fears that the law still contains elements that can 
unnecessarily constrain the work of NGOs in Egypt and hinder our capacity 
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as a foreign donor to support their work. The law has to be in line with 
international standards and obligations of Egypt.”52  
 
Although it is clear that these developments are an enormous blow to the European 
norms of civil society and the idea of deep democracy, the HR refrained from 
accusing Morsi and maintained her cooperative attitude as she added that the EU 
would remain committed to ensure that an NGO law in line with international norms 
is adopted in Egypt.  
Returning to the ENP country Report of 2012, the treatment of civil society 
organizations is not the only concern of the EU. Politically, Egypt went through 
another eventful year including several controversial decisions. Among the 
continued struggle over the legitimacy of the in 2011 elected Egyptian Parliament 
rose two interrelated issues that would become heavily debated both inside and 
outside Egypt. Since the revolution, calls arose for a new Egyptian constitution. But 
because of great political divisions, progress towards the setting up of a committee 
and the actual formulation of the constitution was slow. In a move to speed up this 
process President Morsi issued a decree on November 22 that granted himself 
extensive power in order to break the deadlock over the design of the constitution.53 
As a result, the draft constitution became a rather non-secular document that, instead 
of forming a foundation on which citizens can unite, made many people felt 
disenfranchised. This decision sparked widespread anger among the liberal 
Egyptians and the significant Coptic-Christian minority.54 
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Although a slight majority eventually adopted the drafted constitution via a 
referendum, the EU still voiced its concerns about its controversial process and the 
final document itself. In the country report the EU points out that developments like 
this can create deep political divisions in Egypt. Furthermore, the report stated that 
the new constitution illustrates the lack of progress on human rights and that it does 
not sufficiently guarantee the freedom of religion or the protection of minorities. A 
recurrent theme in the last decade in Egypt is violence against the Coptic 
community. Although there were some signs of mutual sympathy during the 
revolution, violence has broken out several times recently. The EU did not only 
condemn this troubling situation in the annual report, but repeatedly denounced the 
events in separate statements, most recently on April 7, 2013.55 
   Furthermore, the country report stated its concerns over the political 
progress in the country as the Egyptian parliament was ruled illegitimate and had left 
the country somewhat ungoverned for almost a year. Here, the EU emphasized the 
importance for setting up a timetable for the parliamentary elections set for 2013 and 
reiterated its offer to support the event by sending an election observation mission. In 
contrast to 2011 Egypt accepted this offer, albeit only a reduced size of only a 
handful of experts.       
4.4.5 – Evaluating Post-Mubarak Relations 
 
For decades the European Union has seen Egypt as an indispensable partner 
in the Mediterranean neighborhood. This is expressed by the fact that the European 
bodies have independently maintained bilateral contacts with Egypt since 1977. 
However, recent events have significantly influenced this long-lasting relationship. 
The revolution of February 2011 and the ousting of President Mubarak forced the 
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EU to reassess its relationship with the large and geostrategic important country. As 
a result, the EU substituted its traditional priority for stability for the spread of 
democratic norms and values. However, both the transitional government as well as 
the newly elected President Morsi have responded lukewarm to European initiatives. 
In the years since the revolution the EU has continued to offer financial support and 
several partnership deals, but has been given little in return. EU principles 
concerning deep democracy and civil society improvements have not been 
implemented which indicates that the Union has not succeeded in getting a foot in 
the Egyptian door.  
 Looking back, the EU could have made a clearer statement of breaking with 
history by completely replacing the EU-Egypt Association Agreement, The ENP 
Action Plan of 2007 and the Union for the Mediterranean. Although it would not 
have guaranteed an improvement in European leverage over Egypt’s democratic 
development, it would have given off a strong signal. Furthermore, the upholding of 
the agreements gives the new government a reason to be ambiguous towards the EU, 
since it enjoyed close ties with the authoritarian regime.  
 Another weakness in the European strategy towards Egypt is the 
implementation of the new more-for more ENP strategy. The EU maybe should have 
taken a stronger line against the Egyptian authorities for not following up on 
agreements about human rights by not extending several aid programs. This soft 
approach might have marginalized the chances of the EU to influence new governing 
standards. However, withholding financial aid would mean that the already broken 
economy of Egypt would have had even more problems, causing damage to the 
whole society. It may therefore be the better decision of Europe to keep assisting 
Egypt in these difficult times in order to keep the possibilities open for future 
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improvements. Nonetheless, the EU has developed a structure of constant interaction 
with Egypt that accounts for the increased European coherence in dealing with the 
country. This can be seen as a valuable development that results from the work done 
by the HR and the EEAS and that can only contribute to a more successful strategy 
towards Egypt. 
 
4.5 – The Case of Libya 
 
4.5.1 – Introduction 
 
Just as the Tunisian revolution inspired the Egyptian people to rise up against 
their autocratic leader, both the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings inspired large parts 
of the Libyan population to do the same against long-time ruler Colonel Gaddafi. 
While there were already signs of popular unrest in January, the massive protests 
erupted on February 15, 2011, just three days after the resignation of President 
Mubarak. This event demonstrated the domino effect of the Arab revolutionary spirit 
and confirmed that North Africa was experiencing an extraordinary development in 
which three longstanding autocratic regimes rapidly lost their seemingly stable 
positions. From the outside it may look that these protests are similar and can 
therefore be approached in similar ways by external actors such as the EU. However, 
this is definitely not the case due to significant differences in history, revolutionary 
trajectory, and emerging political actors.   
 In contrast to the friendly and stable relationship between Europe and 
Mubarak, Gaddafi had a more troubled political record with its northern neighbors. 
As a result, Libya was sidelined during the setting up of the several trans-
Mediterranean structures and initiatives. However, after about two decades of 
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complete disassociation with the West, Gaddafi and the EU started a path towards 
normalization of relations in April 2004 with the Colonel’s visit to Brussels.56 
During the following years contacts between the EU and Libya intensified as both 
sides were looking to speed up Libya’s integration into the partnerships between the 
EU and the Southern Mediterranean. This resulted in the abolishment of European 
sanctions on Libya and eventually led to the opening of negotiations on an EU-Libya 
framework agreement in November 2008. This agreement would “consolidate 
Libya’s integration in the rule-based international political and economic system.”57 
Yet, when the protest broke out at the beginning of 2011 no concrete agreements 
were concluded meaning that Libya was still excluded from official EU structures.   
 
4.5.2 – War Breaks Out 
 
Just a mere four weeks after the protests emerged the Libyan uprising 
evolved into a full-blown civil war. In response to the initial peaceful protests 
Gaddafi immediately ordered his army to suppress the demonstrations with force, 
which led to a high number of civilian casualties. On the 20th of February Catherine 
Ashton condemned the brutality and urged the authorities to refrain from the use of 
force.58 Yet, violence increased leading the UN Security Council to issue a resolution 
that included a freeze of Gaddafi’s assets, an imposition of an arms embargo on the 
country and an official referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court.59 
In the meantime, the EU had already issued a humanitarian aid package to assist 
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refugees from the country and had also set up a specific border-control mission 
under the umbrella of Frontex, EU’s common border management mechanism, in 
order to manage the flow of migrants. 
 During the first weeks of the conflict, the now armed opposition set up the 
National Transitional Council that operated from the Eastern city of Benghazi over 
which the demonstrators had gained control. This rapid escalation led Ashton and 
President of the Council, Herman van Rompuy, to convene an extraordinary Foreign 
Affairs Council meeting and an extra European Council meeting to discuss the issue. 
There, the heads of state and the Foreign Ministers agreed that the Libyan regime 
had lost all credibility and demanded Gaddafi to step down. However, these 
meetings also meant a break of the unified European response to the Libyan conflict 
as France individually expressed its formal recognition of the Transitional Council 
and the decision to explore the possibility to carry out targeted bombings. This 
unilateral move frustrated HR Ashton and several other European leaders who 
nevertheless expressed the future possibility of European military action in the form 
a no-fly zone. 60  
 While the fighting intensified, including the deployment of warplanes and 
heavy artillery of the regime towards Benghazi, not only the EU but also the entire 
international community became preoccupied with the situation in Libya. Due to the 
break of consensus among the European states the focus shifted to the UN Security 
Council for an international response to this pressing issue. In effect, the much-
anticipated improved European foreign policy mechanism that was constructed in 
order to make the EU an effective global actor failed already at the very first serious 
test (Koening 2011). The Libyan crisis made it clear that the implementation of the 
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Lisbon Treaty had not generated an increased common foreign policy in matters 
entrusted to the Council. This led European diplomats to state that “EU’s security 
and defense policy is closed until further notice”61 or even declare that “CFSP died 
in Libya”.62 Furthermore, the fact that the crisis unfolded on the Union’s doorstep 
and still did not generate a coherent European position caused for concerns (Menon 
2011). 
 The failure to set up a common strategy not only disappointed EU officials 
and European politicians but also upset the US, which had allowed the EU time and 
space to tackle the situation on its own.63 Consequently, the matter was ultimately 
addressed by UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that established a no-fly zone 
over Libya and authorized its members to “take all necessary measures to protect 
civilians while excluding a foreign occupation force.”64 The decision that led to this 
resolution further underlined the internal European differences since the UK and 
France, as fierce supporters of the no-fly zone, voted in favor while Germany chose 
to abstain from voting. As a result, during the subsequent NATO mission, the EU 
was completely sidelined. 
 Nevertheless, HR Catherine Ashton continued to look for emerging issues in 
Libya on which the EU could respond in unity. This effort led to European 
agreements such as the Council’s decision of April 1st to set up a military operation 
in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya. This CSDP decision 
however, should not be seen as a revolutionary statement since it was made 
dependent on a request from the UN office coordinating the security operation, 
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which in the end never came.65 Furthermore, the EU focused on the humanitarian 
crisis and the flow of refugees that came with the intensified violence. In this context 
several plans were adopted that amounted to a total of 85 million Euros for 
immediate relief.66 Maybe more interesting is Ashton’s decision of April 5 to send a 
diplomatic envoy to the “rebel-capital” Benghazi in order to set up contacts with 
Gaddafi’s opposition.67 Considering the support from American, European and Arab 
forces to the rebels it was likely that Gaddafi’s rule would come to an end, which 
motivated the EEAS to open interaction with the opposition early on.   
4.5.3 – Rebuilding Libya 
 
While NATO supported the rebel forces by bombing Gaddafi’s troops and 
supplying valuable intelligence, the EU committed itself to assisting in the planning 
of a post-Gaddafi era. It upheld contacts with the opposition through the EU envoy 
in Benghazi and eventually recognized the interim rebel council as a “legitimate 
interlocutor” on May 11.68 This declaration was followed up by an official visit of 
HR Ashton to Benghazi on May 22, where she opened an enlarged EU office able to 
accommodate all the needs to support a democratic transition.69 In the following 
months the rebels advanced from their Eastern base towards Tripoli to eventually 
capture Libya’s capital on August 21. However, the fighting continued another two 
months until the capture and killing of Colonel Gaddafi, which meant that Libya 
celebrated its first “Day of Liberation” on October 23. This event led to the retreat of 
the foreign forces and paved the way for the EU to fill the gap in assisting the 
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transformed country towards democracy. 
 Since Libya was still not part of the ENP or other EU partnerships, much 
work was to be done in order to incorporate the country into the international 
political mechanisms, one of the main goals of the EU. As a result Brussels started 
its assessment of linking the Libyan needs to Europe’s capabilities and programs. 
This led to an ENP report in May 2012 that pinpointed four aspects in which the EU 
could provide support, namely security, migration, deep democracy and economy. 70  
Among these four issues, national security required the highest priority as the 
report stated that there was virtually no police force nor national army and public 
services were very weak. Considering that there were armed militias in the country 
and in the region, the setting up of border management became top priority. 
Although this was initially the responsibility of NATO, the EU expressed its 
intention to take over their tasks in early 2012. Subsequently, the EU sent an 
assessment mission in March. It took however until December for the Foreign 
Affairs Council to consider their report and agreed to continue the efforts. This laid 
the fundament for the eventual CSDP mission that was approved by a Council 
decision on May 22, 2013.71 The decision enjoyed high support as all member states 
offered to contribute to the border management mission that is being deployed in the 
summer of 2013. Yet, the fact that it took the EU more than a year to get from the 
initiative to the execution raises concerns about the flexibility and adeptness of the 
EU as a security actor (Hatzigeorgopoulos & Andrianarijaona 2013). In addition to 
the border security mission, the EU assisted the new authorities with several 
programs in order to tackle primary needs. A total of 25 million Euros was made 
available to help, for example, in clearing unexploded missiles and to set up a 
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security reform and rule of law program.   
An extension of Libya’s security issue was the problem of migration. The 
Libyan war had caused a flow of migrants towards Europe but also towards other 
African countries. In response, the EU allocated 19 million Euros to programs 
dealing with the migration flows, such as voluntary repatriation. Furthermore, due to 
Gaddafi’s reliance on foreign fighters during the war, Libya also hosted immigrants 
who were often maltreated after the conflict. The EU raised its concern over the 
multitude of human rights violations, such as torture and illegal detention, towards 
these migrants. Regrettably, the report of March 2013 emphasized that progress in 
this aspect has been very limited.72 
Another priority in Libya, according to the EU, was the creation of favorable 
conditions to the development of deep democracy. Under the old regime independent 
civil society organizations were not allowed, thus causing a huge reliance on foreign 
actors in this new era. In response, the EU has pledged a significant sum to support 
the civil society actors that were eager to use the opportunity. Moreover, the EEAS 
organized the EU-Libya civil society forum in order to promote partnerships 
between European and Libyan NGO’s and also set up training and information 
centers across the country in order to assist these starting organizations. 
Besides the promotion of civil society, the EU also assisted in more direct 
aspects towards democratic transition, most notably during the first free Libyan 
elections of July 7, 2012. The EU assisted through an EU election observation 
mission that had already began its tasks in April. The successful, pluralistic and 
peaceful process was welcomed by HR Ashton who congratulated the Libyan people 
“for their determination to move forward on the road to democracy in a peaceful and 
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dignified manner.”73 Moreover, the election of 33 women to the National Congress 
was also warmly welcomed. What followed was the formulation of a national 
constitution. Also here the EU offered support to the drafting in order to press 
forward its values such as respect for human rights and the protection of minorities. 
However, this process is still underway and has seen some setbacks due to serious 
intimidations of lawmakers and conflicts over the composition of the constitutional 
committee.74 
 The forth aspect of European concern is the composition of Libya’s 
economy. The Libyan economy is for 90% dependent on oil and gas exports, mainly 
to Europe, and also has a very high unemployment rate that has been at that level for 
decades.75 These facts indicate that Libya has a very under-developed economy that 
can threaten the progress towards a sustainable democracy. In response, the EU has 
set up a program to diversify the economy and to modernize the labor market. 
Considering its modest budget of 6,5 million Euros one could claim that the EU has 
not committed itself enough to this aspect of building a stronger Libya. 
4.5.4 – Evaluating EU’s Response to the Libyan Crisis 
It is clear that EU’s main goal considering Libya is to rapidly include it in the 
arena of international politics and to involve it in international trade and treaties. The 
former situation in which Colonel Gaddafi formed an unpredictable actor on the 
border of the European continent is undesired by all. In this respect the EU has done 
a lot and now sees the new government progressing towards integration. The 
decision to join the Union for the Mediterranean as an observer in January 2013 
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underlines this development. In this respect the EEAS played a major role as a 
negotiating and supporting actor. The setting up of EU offices in several cities across 
the country and engaging with the opposition in an early stage has yielded the EU a 
foot in the door in Libya’s new government. This open stance towards EU 
involvement was already expressed during Ashton’s visit to Benghazi in May 2011 
when she was warmly greeted by the people in the streets.76 
 This however conceals the failure of the EU, and in particular that of the HR 
and the EEAS, during the initial stages of the crisis. In the first weeks of the 
rebellion against Gaddafi’s regime the EU did not succeed in speaking with one 
voice. The unilateral declaration of France to support the representative body of the 
rebels indicated the start of a divided Europe. The break of the consensus must be 
seen as a diplomatic failure of the European bodies since it is their main task to 
formulate declarations to which all member states can agree. Shortly after that the 
European differences appeared again, now in the UN Security Council, stipulating a 
continental rift. Furthermore, HR Ashton backed the campaign of overthrowing 
Gaddafi only after the UN Security Council Resolution was published, indicating 
that she feared to speak out as the representative of a growing global actor. 
 In the months that followed, NATO executed the UN resolution of the no-fly 
zone. The sidelining of the EU and the involvement of other foreign actors might 
have created a legacy that subsequently impeded the EU from formulating an 
adequate and timely response to the responsibilities it had taken on. An example of 
this is the lengthy process of setting up a border security mission under the umbrella 
of the CSDP.  
However, the profound involvement of France and the UK during the NATO 
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mission has been greeted by the Libyan people with open arms and has boosted the 
image of Europe in the country. As a result, the EU has been able to feed off of that 
and has seen its influence in the country grow. However, Libya is still far from a 
stable democracy or European partner and is still facing pressing security issues. 
Continued European dedication is therefore crucial. Unfortunately, according to the 
yearly EU foreign policy scorecard of the independent European Council on Foreign 
Relations this has not been the case. It concludes that its seems as if attention has 
shifted away from Libya now that much of the urgency has gone and argues that the 
EU might have achieved more if greater energy and resources were allocated.77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
77 European Council on Foreign Policy, European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2013. 
 79 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 – Introduction 
 
By grouping together the findings of the previous chapters, this part of the 
research tries to identify elements that contribute to the overall knowledge on the 
functioning of the European External Action Force. In the end, the aim of this 
research is to explain the new foreign policy mechanism and to assess whether it has 
succeeded in fulfilling its objectives. Therefore, the theoretical framework of MLG 
will figure as a background to understand the impact the EEAS makes on EU foreign 
policy. In doing so the EEAS will be evaluated against the model of MLG as 
described by Gary Marks, while also including a perspective on the rivaling theory 
of Liberal Intergovernmentalism of Moravcsik. In addition, the conclusions of 
Michael Smits, who identified situations in which the functioning of MLG is 
problematic, will be compared to the experiences of the EEAS. 
In order to illustrate this, the findings from the relevant case studies and the 
overall response of the EU on the Arab uprisings will be used. Furthermore, these 
findings will contribute to our understanding of what the EEAS effectively does and 
how their policy should be interpreted in the larger context of the European Union. 
Looking ahead to the probable extension of the EEAS’ mandate in 2014, this 
research can now also illustrate the weaknesses and strengths of the agency. 
Eventually the combined findings of the three research chapters will lead to 
conclusions, which in turn will answer the central question: To what extent has the 
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EEAS, as created by the Treaty of Lisbon, achieved its goal of turning the EU into an 
effective global actor when reviewing its response to the Arab uprisings? 
 
5.2 – MLG as a Theory for the EEAS 
 
As previously mentioned, the Multi-level Governance theory of Gary Marks 
should be seen as a vehicle in order to understand the impact of the EEAS on EU 
foreign policy and how it relates to the member states. The EEAS is undoubtedly a 
revolutionary institution since it is the first diplomatic service of a non-state actor. It 
was created as a result of the European wish to speak out as one in international 
politics, but also emerged as a response to an increased demand for an agency that 
would bring coherence to the EU’s multitude of implicit and explicit foreign policy 
responsibilities. This latter fact has been a traditional theme in the European 
structure since the central organizations in Brussels repeatedly explored their legal 
boundaries and also overstepped them. Looking back, member states have tried to 
accommodate this inclination by setting up the EPC and later the CFSP. Both 
structures almost immediately failed in their task to bring the foreign policy 
actorness of the EU closer to the authority of the member state. As a result of this 
failure the Commission emerged as a global actor. With the signing of the Lisbon 
Treaty, and the creation of the EEAS in combination with the increased authority of 
the HR, the member states have tried to accommodate this problem for once and for 
all.  
 The result is a diplomatic service that is legally placed in between the 
supranational Commission and the intergovernmental Council, thereby literally 
adding another intermediary level to the European foreign policy mechanism. 
However, this feature is not the reason to apply MLG to the EEAS.  In the first place, 
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MLG is solely dedicated to contribute to our understanding of governance as 
opposed to European integration as most other theories do. MLG thus rose to 
prominence when the EU developed uncontested supranational powers in the 
policies concerning trade, national economy and the environment. As for the case of 
foreign policy, the EU developed less rapidly and can be characterized today as a sui 
generis mechanism of cooperation. Nevertheless, also here MLG can be used to 
make relevant claims.  
 When analyzing the EEAS and the current European foreign policy structure, 
one can identify its independent character since it has been handed a significant 
amount of resources for it to operate autonomously. In turn, those resources allow 
the EEAS to influence all aspects of EU foreign policy-making, most notably in the 
policy initiative stage. This connects to Marks’ observation that EU member states 
have lost their full control over the process. Moreover, the assumption that EU 
institutions work independently from member states is also confirmed by the EEAS’ 
daily operation. MLG argues that these mechanisms do not necessarily imply a 
supranational authority and acknowledges the prominent role of the state since it still 
sees it as the center of power, although it now has to share it. This argument is 
reflected by the European reality that decisions of CFSP are to be taken 
unanimously. 
 The description of the new foreign policy mechanism as a structure with the 
ability to interfere in several elements of the policy-making procedure also brings to 
mind the concept of policy networks on which Marks derived his theory. The 
composition of the EEAS reflects an interconnected web of actors who are involved 
in every stage of policy making. This multitude of commissions within the EEAS 
however complicates the characterization of the agency as compared to the 
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prescribed types of MLG according to Marks and Hooghe. Whereas Type 1 MLG is 
characterized by clear jurisdictions and boundaries of actors within the larger system, 
Type 2 prescribes a more fluid structure in which actors intersect. Here, one might 
think that Type 2 would therefore better grasp the operating of the EEAS. Yet, Type 
2 MLG is seen as a goal-oriented structure that does not confine itself to a certain 
geographical scope, such as the Kyoto agreements on the environment. In that 
respect the EEAS does not mirror this description. Also keeping in mind that Type 1 
MLG is closely linked to the operating of a federal system, which does also not 
apply to the case of the EEAS, one could conclude that the EEAS not only holds a 
unique position in practice but also in theory. 
 
5.3 – The EEAS and Moravcsik’s Approach 
 
On the other hand, the practice of unanimity in the Council could also 
validate the claim of the opposing state-centric approach of Moravcsik. He argues 
that EU policies reflect nothing more than the lowest common denominator and that 
the member states ultimately hold all authority over the EU. In certain cases of EU 
governance this claim has often been proved wrong. However, in the aspect of CFSP 
member states do possess the ultimate decision-making power. A great example of 
this is the mentioned choice of France to respond unilaterally to the crisis in Libya. 
This case does reflect to some extent also the claim that European states use EU 
institutions only in cases when they facilitate the state and help achieve goals that are 
individually unattainable.   
 Yet, Moravcsik’s claim that EU institutions do not possess independent 
power and that the state is the uncontested locus of power fails to explain the impact 
of the EEAS. Especially its feature as an organ with policy initiative power is 
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heavily underestimated by this theory. Moreover, this independent power has been 
underlined by the European states through the allocation of significant powers to the 
HR. Since the Treaty of Lisbon this official is allowed to autonomously represent the 
EU in external affairs and has been given a particular position as the central figure 
through which all policies should pass. As previously stated, much will depend on 
the ability of the HR to generate that authority into real power.  
In short, although the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism by Moravcsik 
has lost most of its credibility in other fields of European governance it does 
maintain certain relevance when it comes to EU foreign policy. However, its central 
claim that EU institutions do not posses independent authority fails to describe the 
development of this new EU foreign policy mechanism. In the case of understanding 
the role of the EEAS, the concept of MLG is of more help. Gary Marks’ perception 
of European governance is reflected by the position of the EEAS as the central actor 
in many policy networks, thereby exercising its influence through indirect channels.    
 
5.4 – Evaluating Europe’s Initial Response 
 
Since the impact of the EEAS on the European political arena has been 
formulated by the analysis above, this chapter now turns to the task of assessing the 
Union’s response to the Arab uprisings that started in 2010 but continue to dominate 
the political agenda. Through the Lisbon Treaty the EU bolstered its facilities in 
order to take on more responsibilities in international politics. Subsequently, it 
formulated several objectives. The main objective of the Lisbon Treaty was to create 
preconditions so that the EU would become an effective global actor. In order to 
become one, the European states realized that enhanced policy coherence and ample 
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resources were key to the successfulness of this mission. However, in the end it all 
depends on how these are used and whether they are used effectively. 
 By the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, the HR and the EEAS were tasked to 
bring all the formerly dispersed EU activities concerning foreign policy together and 
accommodate them in order to make the EU more effective. It must be pointed out 
that with the Lisbon Treaty came no significant new tasks or approached, rather it 
reformed the already existent structures. This implies that the policy procedures of 
both CFSP and non-CFSP issues remained largely unchanged. Within these 
boundaries both the HR and the EEAS now work towards the creation of a common 
and coherent EU policy. As straightforward as it might sound, this task demands a 
lot of skill in practice. 
 The idea behind positioning the EEAS in between the Council and the 
Commission, and the double-hat function of the HR as both Commissioner and actor 
in the Council, was to provide the new structure with all the information and 
connections it needed to execute its role. In turn, this central agency could then 
streamline European foreign policy and generate a harmonization among the member 
states. In much of the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings it has spoken with a single 
voice. During the initial weeks of the events the European leaders rallied behind 
Brussels and voiced the importance of a common policy. However, the HR and the 
EEAS did not respond adequately since Brussels purely reacted on the events and 
remained conservative in its declarations towards the autocratic leaders. Here, the 
HR could have called for an exceptional meeting of the heads of state in order to 
create a common statement that could have been crafted by the EEAS.    
 While the protests expanded and signs of a transnational revolutionary spirit 
emerged, the EEAS and the HR turned inward instead of stepping forward. In 
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Brussels work focused on reformulating former policies towards the Southern 
Mediterranean. Although this revision produced a set of objectives and a guideline 
for European policy towards the changing region, it meant that the EU did not 
present itself as the global actor that it aims to be. Especially the HR, with her power 
to convene meetings and her obligation to understand different viewpoints of the 
member states, should have responded more adequately to the situation. After 
decades of foreign policy coordination in Europe the member states developed a 
norm and an impulse to work towards unity and common policies. Yet, Ashton 
awaited the situation and retreated to eventually present a new strategy while 
European governments formulated national positions. This development of 
continental divergence came to the fore during the first extraordinary meeting that 
was issued as a response to the worsening of the conflict in Libya. Here, France 
unilaterally declared its offensive approach and since this position was far too radical 
for other members the consensus broke.  
 In hindsight, the HR and her diplomatic service maybe should have focused 
more on the task of member state harmonization by starting to bring state 
representatives to the negotiation table in an early stage. Since the meeting was 
called for in such a late stage state policies had drifted apart. To be fair, the 
suggestion of opening the discussion immediately does not guarantee that the 
members would have come to a common policy. Still, it would have given the EEAS 
and the HR more time to flex their diplomatic muscles in order to broker a consensus 
so that the EU would step forward as a unified block. 
 Following this analysis one could claim that the new foreign policy 
mechanism did not sufficiently exploit its mandate at the outset of the Arab revolts. 
Although the position of the HR was not given the explicit task of forming the 
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frontrunner in issues like this, the legal documents concerning the new foreign policy 
structure left room for interpretation. As mentioned in the chapter analyzing the 
institutional framework, the success and prominence of the EU as a global actor 
heavily depends on the personal ability and willingness of the HR and how she 
deploys her supportive agency. 
 
5.5 – The New Strategy 
 
With the fall of the autocratic regimes arose the opportunity for Europe to re-
establish a trans-Mediterranean strategy that is based on democratic values and 
humanitarian norms. Due to solidified ties between the EU and the undemocratic 
regimes the priority of EU policy towards its southern neighbors shifted toward 
stability, thereby dwarfing democratic values in the process. This supportive 
relationship towards the old regimes, especially to that of Mubarak, stood in direct 
contrast with its external objectives as emphasized by the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 
21 clearly states that the EU aims to spread democratic values, promote good 
governance and increase social equality. Moreover, the document stipulating the 
goals of the ENP, the European program that actually executes the EU policies in the 
direct neighborhood, addressed the issue by aiming for a shared prosperity and 
shared rights and values. However, the aim of countering terrorism and the need for 
stability persisted in outweighing the more normative objectives.  
As a result, the EU responded to the revolutions by withdrawing its support 
for the undemocratic leaders and expressing its support for the protestors. The 
opportunity to return to the normative agenda was welcomed by the officials in 
Brussels and work centered around formulating a new strategy that would assist the 
countries in transition while also securing European interest in the long run. This 
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approach is reflected by the publication of two documents that now form the basis of 
the new relationship. Central to this new approach is the more-for-more principle, 
which entails that the EU allocates more assistance in either money, mobility or 
market access to a country that demonstrates a dedication to democratic reform. This 
implies that the EU now pursues a differentiated approach to these countries instead 
of the one-size-fits-all approach that was maintained the previous decades. This can 
be seen as a direct result of the increased capabilities of the EU as a foreign policy 
actor since it now has the manpower to implement such an approach. 
Consequently, the EEAS opened relations with the transitional governments 
in both Libya and Egypt. Although the EU stipulated its more-for-more strategy as a 
clear policy with clear objectives it remained unclear what was expected from the 
partner countries since standards of exchange were not defined. As a result, the Arab 
countries do not know what is expected for them in order to get additional support. 
However, from the European rhetoric one can derive that the EU’s principle aims are 
the creation of a civil society that fosters the emergence of deep democracy. This 
includes a multitude of issues relating to security, economy, human rights and 
governance.  
When analyzing its implementation in both Egypt and Libya one can claim 
that this policy has yielded the EU mixed results. In both cases the EU extended both 
financial and institutional aid seemingly unconditionally, but it did not always 
receive the preferred outcome. In the case of Egypt, the EU primarily focused on the 
human rights situation in the country and the treatment of civil society organizations. 
Ashton repeatedly stressed Europe’s concern over the desperate situation both these 
issues still find themselves in. However, both the transitional government and the 
civil government under the control of President Morsi did not answer these calls. The 
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treatment of civil society organizations, and NGO’s in particular, angers European 
officials. Also the European offer to provide an independent election observation 
mission was repeatedly rejected by the governing officials.  
In dealing with Egypt, the EU relies mainly on the ENP Action Plan of 2007 
and the Association Agreement of 2004. Together these documents form the basis of 
EU-Egypt relations and stipulate the envisioned Egyptian path towards improvement 
and prosperity. However, this might be the fundamental problem of the apparent 
unwilling position of Egypt to move towards the EU. The EU was a staunch 
supporter of Mubarak’s regime that had angered so many Egyptian civilians. The 
documents currently referred to by the EU are remnants of an unpopular era. It might 
well be possible that the Egyptian government is hesitant to start a process of close 
relationship with an actor that has been vital to the persistence of the autocratic 
regime. In this respect the EEAS and the HR might have failed to identify this 
feeling of resentment to the EU. Instead of continuing to refer to documents 
stemming from a time of which the Egyptian people try to break off from, the EU 
should have abandoned the former agreements and have voiced its intention to start a 
relationship based on new documents.  
Contrary to the case of Egypt, Libya has a historically different relationship 
with the EU. Due to the often controversial and obstinate attitude of Colonel 
Gaddafi, the EU enjoyed a far less friendly relationship with Libya’s autocrat than 
with Egypt’s. This is reflected by the isolated position of Libya whit regard to EU-
Mediterranean initiatives. Subsequently, when the Libyan people started 
demonstrating against the regime, the EU profited from a rather spotless history and 
found a positive response from the Libyan opposition. However, here the EU could 
not rely on former channels of information and partnership agreements, meaning that 
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in post-revolutionary Libya the EU had to begin from scratch. Yet, the diplomatic 
efforts have resulted in a modest European influence in building a new Libya. 
Currently, the population is welcoming civil society programs and the European 
initiatives of enhancing Libya’s process of integrating in the international political 
arena have met little opposition.  
Now, it is of great importance that the EU continues its support to Libya 
since the country is far from stable and far from being a full European partner. 
Unfortunately, reports indicate that this dedication and attention is slipping away 
from Libya and that aid is reduced. Considering this development in Libya and the 
persistent sending of support packages towards an underachieving Egyptian 
government, this indicates that the hailed more-for-more strategy is not implemented 
correctly by the EEAS. Conversely, the country that is overachieving is experiencing 
a fall of support. It is therefore of great importance that the EU shows its loyalty to 
the Libyan people in order to prove that the new strategy is more than the current 
hollow statement.  
However, also in the case of Libya the EEAS and the HR have failed 
significantly. In two separate issues considering military involvement in Libya, the 
EU has shown its weakness. Most prominent is the already mentioned European 
crisis on how to respond to the outbreak of a civil war in the country. Here, the 
EEAS and the HR could have reacted better and subsequently steered the European 
leaders towards a consensus. Also the other security operation considering Libya, the 
border control mission, has seen significant complications. The fact that the whole 
process from voicing the intention to actual action now already lasts for more than a 
year illustrates that the EEAS, who is also closely related to this element of 
European foreign policy, has failed to deliver. Here, the service could have done 
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more to speed up the process and to demonstrate an improvement in the EU’s daily 
operating considering foreign policy.  
 
5.6 – Linking the Findings Back to Theory 
 
Both the case of Libya and Egypt bring to mind the classification of Smith on 
the preferable preconditions of a situation for the effectiveness of MLG. He pointed 
out in his article of 2004 that Europe’s foreign policy making regime could be 
characterized as a MLG model, but that there are several obstacles that can hinder its 
effective functioning. According to him these obstacles were: 
 
• The crisis demanding a response is very violent. 
• The crisis demanding a response calls for direct action. 
• In cases where consensus is the formal rule of decision-making 
• In cases where the European Council has no mandate. 
• In cases where the EU is dependent on states for the implementation 
of the policy. 
• In cases where the EU needs extra funding from the member states. 
 
When evaluating these points in reverse order one can claim that due to the 
creation if the EEAS the last two obstacles have been overcome since the EU now 
possesses ample resources to pursue foreign policy independently. As for the third 
and the forth, the EEAS was created to diminish these obstacles. Yet in practice the 
agency has not been able to tackle these problems yet. As for the case of European 
military interference in Libya, the EEAS and the HR did not accommodate the 
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members enough to work towards consensus. Hopefully this can be a lesson for the 
future so that also these obstacles can be overcome. Considering the first two 
obstacles, the new foreign policy structure seems not to have improved since 2004. 
EU response to crisis situations has remained rather slow and ineffective in cases of 
violent clashes. In order to overcome these obstacles the EU member states should 
allocate more resources to Brussels, particularly in the form of military capabilities. 
Since that constitutes a traditionally controversial transferal of power to the 
European bodies, this is not to be expected to happen in the near future.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This research aimed to evaluate the new European foreign policy structure 
that came into being after the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon. Central to this new 
constellation is the position of the HR and the creation of her supportive agency, the 
EEAS. Right after this new structure was put into place a revolutionary spirit swept 
across the Arab world, leading three longstanding North-African regimes to fall. 
This crisis brought great instability right to the backyard of the European Union. 
Consequently, the transitional process of these countries became the primary focus 
of this newly enhanced continental foreign policy agency. This thesis demonstrates 
that, after having analyzed its legal and material capabilities and having examined its 
policies and initiatives towards the changed Arab world, the EEAS and the HR have 
only partially succeeded in attaining their objectives. 
 In assessing the effectiveness of the EEAS this research first turned to 
analyzing the character of this new agency and concluded that it must be seen as a 
mechanism sui generis. Its specific position in between the larger European decision-
making bodies allows it to influence all aspects of foreign policy through its 
network. This assumption is supported by the MLG concept of Gary Marks. 
Although the concept is not completely compatible with the functioning of the 
EEAS, it has some significant explanatory value and has therefore allowed this 
research to grasp the impact it has on EU foreign policy. 
Returning to the goals of the EEAS, their main objective is to bring the EU 
forward as an effective global power, meaning that the institution grows towards 
being a powerful actor with international leverage. Although the legal foundations, 
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in the form of the Lisbon Treaty, refrain from allocating these institutions with 
explicit and revolutionary powers, this research demonstrates that within their 
capabilities the EEAS and the HR have failed to deliver on their main objective. 
Both actors have been allocated control over a wide range of foreign policy tools, but 
have been unable to implement them effectively. As a result, the EU did not rise up 
as a power to be reckoned with and it most certainly did not resemble the expected 
significant increase as compared to Europe’s external profile before the Treaty of 
Lisbon. As mentioned before, the EEAS turned inward and went back to the drawing 
table to set up a new strategy. Not only did it thereby miss the opportunity to stand 
up as a visible actor both towards the member states and the outside world, the 
eventual strategy also failed to deliver since the more-for-more policy is currently 
being neglected in Europe’s dealing with these states in transition.  
 Additionally, the EEAS has failed to act as a coherent and vigorous actor on 
different aspects in the separate cases of Egypt and Libya. Considering Libya, the 
EEAS failed to bring about internal coherence on the issue, leading the EU to remain 
sidelined for most of the transitional process. Only in a later stage the EU has 
succeeded in stepping forward as a unitary actor, albeit on matters of little 
controversy such as civil society assistance. Furthermore, the lengthy process of 
deploying border security missions again underline the European struggle to act 
rapidly and forcefully. 
 In Egypt problems with executing a foreign policy emerged in dealing with 
the new government that replaced the former regime. Here, the EEAS managed to 
formulate a strategy that is supported internally. Yet, it did not manage to acquire 
any form of leverage vis-à-vis the Egyptian government in order to convince them to 
comply with the European perceived path towards democratic values and stability. 
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Although it is hard to point out exactly where these differences come from, one 
could point towards the formerly supportive stance of the EU towards the unpopular 
regime of Mubarak. Although the EU openly sided with the protesters during the 
revolution, the EEAS have not thoroughly followed up on this change of support 
since it still refers to documents stemming from the Mubarak era in its relationship 
with Egypt today.  
In the case of Egypt, a reinvigoration of the Union for the Mediterranean 
could also help the EU in transferring its policies. Although unpopular EU-Mubarak 
relations heavily mark this organization, this structure is characterized by 
multilateralism instead of the bilateral relations that govern the current relationship. 
The difference is that in the latter structure the EU might come forward as a 
patronizing factor, whereas in the former the Arab states might feel a more shared 
ownership over the organization, thereby making them more involved.    
 Nonetheless, the creation of the EEAS and the newly formulated position of 
the HR have also yielded the EU some minor advancement, most notably in the 
setting up of offices and facilities that help the EU in constructing a coherent policy. 
Unfortunately, with regard to the Arab uprisings this has only been used in the 
distribution of financial aid. However, such a process takes time to work effectively. 
In that respect one could defend the current shortcoming of the EEAS in its response 
to the Arab Spring by pointing out that the EEAS faced these crises hardly a month 
after its official launch. In effect, when the revolutions broke out the EEAS was 
hardly operating and the internal arrangements were not really developed. 
Consequently, the events have tested the new foreign policy structure right at the 
beginning, thereby immediately demonstrating its shortcomings.  
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It will be of great interest to see if the organization is able to take lessons 
from this and transfer them into new policies that generate a more effective 
operation. In this respect, much will come down to the character and skills of the HR 
to exploit her mandate and to generate an effective European foreign policy that 
reflects more than just the lowest common denominator. This suggests to other 
researchers to continue studies on EU foreign policy to see whether the EEAS is able 
to convince member states to give up their national policy for a common and more 
forceful European position. The moment this happens will signify a revolutionary 
step in the development of the EU as an effective global actor. In the end, it is only 
on the internal aspect that the EU has full control.       
Overall, this research supports a renewal of the mandate for the EEAS 
considering that it has the potential to generate a coherent and strong foreign policy. 
This research has demonstrated, with the use of the MLG theory, that the EEAS is 
sufficiently equipped to realize the EU’s goals, thereby refuting the hypothesis of 
this research that the EEAS does not posses real capabilities. Yet regrettably, the 
other hypothesis has been confirmed since the Arab uprisings have not generated 
such an effective European policy. Still, this experience might have offered the 
EEAS insight in how to improve the current structure and on how to respond to 
crises such as these. This study however would advise the EU to terminate the 
mandate of the current HR Catherine Ashton, since she has failed to demonstrate her 
determination to bring the EU to the level of an international actor that is to be 
reckoned with. Especially her reactive attitude to the situations and her inability to 
bring together both European and Arab partners in order to find common grounds 
and mutual objectives has led this research to belief that she has impeded the 
efficient operating of the new foreign policy structure.  
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When putting the developments of the last two years in historical perspective, 
one can conclude that the Treaty of Lisbon signifies yet another step in the 
incremental development of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Still it is thus far the 
most revolutionary one, since the EU now officially possesses an independent 
foreign policy institution. Over the course of the coming years the world will find 
out whether this agency is allowed to step forward and whether it is able to use its 
mandate in order to turn the EU into the global actor it aspires to be. 
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